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CIA's now 'a model of openness'

THE CENTRAL Intelligence Agency, which has taken its lumps since Watergate, has gone so far in trying to improve its public image that it now passes out information kits about the super-secret agency to reporters.

That, and a new "openness" about the CIA, have made it a new model of American intelligence, according to Adm. Stansfield Turner, agency director.

Turner, in Chicago Monday to address a meeting of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, said, however, "We must still have secrecy in the intelligence community."

"BUT WE are continuing to review what we can make public, and what can be public will be," he told reporters. His press conference and address, part of a series he is making throughout the country, was designed to convince the people of the CIA's forthrightness.

The information kit included background on the CIA and a report it prepared on the international energy outlook to 1985. The CIA's conclusions were not encouraging for the United States; it reported that oil and gas supplies will increase little outside the OPEC nations.

Turner, who fired 198 employees of the CIA's operations section, effective March 31, said another 700 would be dropped by Oct. 31, 1979, adding that there is "unanimity in the CIA that it is overstaffed."

"I found that my two predecessors had been planning a major reduction in the operation of that section, and I made the decision to go ahead, and I also made additional cuts," he said. "It's never easy to tell someone that his services are not required, but as a taxpayer I cannot condone excess personnel."

THE PRINCIPAL function of the operations section, consisting of 4,000 officers and 4,000 support personnel, is the gathering of intelligence. Turner said a good part of the CIA program is research that is evaluated by the government's decision makers.

He said he is hopeful that Russia will stop the microwave radiation of the U.S. embassy in Moscow that has been going on for years.

15 November 1977

Turner denies technology dictates CIA staff reductions

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By Leon Pitt

Adm. Stansfield Turner, Central Intelligence Agency director, denied here Monday published reports that some 900 CIA agents are being fired because the agency is using more efficient technical intelligence-gathering processes.

"We did not make the cuts because I think technological intelligence will replace human intelligence. I'm merely cutting the overhead," Turner declared.

He said the staff reductions, announced last August, were due to a buildup of personnel during the Vietnam War. "Excess people are not good for efficiency and morale . . ." Turner stressed at a press conference before addressing a luncheon of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.

Newspaper reports over the weekend stated that although CIA officials had said cutbacks in personnel over the next two years are being made for reasons of economy, it is also believed that technology is a factor. In recent years, the CIA has relied increasingly on technical devices, including satellites and electronic interceptors for collection of information.

The reports said the cutbacks, which are expected to be completed by Dec. 31, 1979, will cut deeply into the top ranks of the clandestine organization.

Turner also said Monday America's commercial microwave telecommunications are being intercepted at the Russian Embassy in Washington. The Soviets are monitoring

"whatever goes onto unsecured telephone links" from transmitting microwave satellites, he said.

He said the monitoring would be discussed with the Soviets before long and that, in the meantime, confidential information should be transmitted by cable or "encrypted (coded)."

"This problem (microwave interception) is much more widespread," Turner said, adding that industrial spies and even private citizens are intercepting microwave transmissions.

Turner said his visit to Chicago was "part of the new openness" of the CIA as mandated by President Carter. He said that since he assumed leadership of the much-criticized agency last March, it has become "more open and forthright" with the American public.

However, Turner, a native of Highland Park, stressed that "we must have secrecy. You can't have intelligence without secrecy."

He added that the bulk of intelligence gathering was not from "clandestine" operations but through research "just like you would find in a large corporation or university."

Noting that the CIA reports to at least eight congressional committees at various times, Turner said the practice gives "balance" to the CIA but it also entails risks. One risk, he said, is "timidity," another is "leaks."

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PRESS CONFERENCE

CHICAGO COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

14 NOVEMBER 1977

Q. Why wasn't CIA able to predict with any certainty the failure of the Russian crops?

A. CIA missed the crop failure by some 10%--if Mr. Brezhnev either is telling us the truth or in fact has good estimates of his own. We don't like to miss by 10%, but we are pleased that in the last four or five years since the country was sort of taken by the great train robbery of 1932 we have developed a reasonably good prediction. We were off more this year than before. But it is a difficult technique when you are dealing against a closed society which is not sharing its information with you. It is fortunate that we have a capability to keep abreast of things like this which do affect our own economy. But I'd like to say we don't think the country was taken this time by the Soviets because we were predicting on the first of July onward much larger Soviet grain purchases than they were acknowledging. And we think the market understood that.

Q. I would like to ask about the stories of the microwave radiation at the American Embassy in Moscow and I suppose what I should ask you to tell us what causes it? What can be done to stop it? Just how serious is it vis-a-vis our own intelligence in Moscow?

A. What causes it is a different set of morals and standards by the Soviet Union in the way they behave and standards that they'll go to to collect intelligence information. There has been radiation against our Embassy there for a number of years. I'm happy to say that the power levels of it are low enough that we don't believe its an endangerment to human life. It happens that the Soviet standards of what radiation people can accept is about a 1,000 times smaller than ours. They have not exceeded their standards so we don't think it's injurious but it is infideous. It is obviously designed to try to interfere with our activities or to obtain information from our activities.

- Q. Can you, with whatever mechanical means you have at your disposal, stop this radiation?
- A. That is very, very difficult to do from a purely mechanical point of view. They have the territory around us--they could beam from all kinds of directions at us. Technically we have great difficulty in actually stopping that kind of thing. It has to be done by persuasion rather than by brute force.
- Q. A report states that some of that microwave radiation is caused by one of our own antennas on top of the Embassy and that we waited a year and a half or so before we took that antenna off because we didn't want the Russians to state that we were causing all the interference.
- A. You have better intelligence than I do. I've been away for a couple of days and I don't know anything about that particular report.
- Q. Is there any indication that the Soviet intelligence operation in this country is using anything like that?
- A. We know that the Soviets in this country are intercepting our commercial microwave transmissions. We don't have any evidence of radiation against us like they have in Moscow.
- Q. What is that, sir?
- A. It's done from their embassy in Washington, D.C. and it's a danger to us. It's something that we've taken precautions on and on which national policy is being formulated and I think will be enunciated before too long. I'm not free to go much further until that is available to us.

- Q. How much could they pick up by interception of commercial microwave here, in this country?
- A. Did you all read the interesting report in the press--that during the Lufthansa hijacking a man in Israel sat in his apartment with an antenna and he listened to the German commandos chase plane go into Mogadiscio. He turned that information over and it was broadcasted on Israeli radio before the raid took place, before the commandos operated. Fortunately they managed to get it stopped before it went on Israeli television. The information did not apparently get to the hijackers. And then that man sat there and listened to commando operations and how they were progressing. In short, this problem is much more widespread in the world than in our country, than just the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C. Whatever goes onto unclassified telephone links that go on the microwave and a lot of it does go on the microwave today. In Washington, D.C. you can make telephone calls from one side of the city to the other and that call will go 22,000 miles up to a satellite and back down again to go 10 miles across the city. But if it is on a microwave link, hijackers, gangsters, foreign intelligence operators, industrial spies and all work to get that information. And it is a problem that the whole country has and much more than in the intelligence sphere.
- Q. Is that the same category that is interfered with in Moscow? Just how serious is their interference, with normal and/or intelligence operations in Moscow? Is it just what goes out over telephone lines by microwave? Are we able to circumvent this?
- A. In Moscow we don't have any microwaves. We are not positively clear what they are interfering with. They help themselves in ways that are very technical and I can't answer that for you--I really can't.

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- Q. (Was unintelligible, but had to do with DDO cutbacks.)
- A. I came to this job in February and found that my two predecessors and the incumbent professionals in the Central Intelligence Agency had been planning a major reduction in force in order to get back down from the large buildup in Vietnam. In August I made my decision to go ahead with that reduction. I cut it back slightly and I compressed the time frame to two years to avoid having a prolonged period of uncertainty within the Agency. When I announced that decision nobody objected to it. There is almost unanimity of feeling within the organization that we are over-staffed. I promised at that time that the first half of the cut would be announced by the first of November and the second half by the first of June. We announced those on the first of November and now you get a lot of complaints. I'm sorry--it's never easy to tell people that their services are no longer required. I would like not to have done that. But as a taxpayer I cannot condone keeping people on the payroll whom the government doesn't need and as a man I'm very concerned with both the effectiveness and morale of the Agency. (next few sentences unintelligible) We made these announcements, we made these cuts, I think, in the long-term interest of the Agency. We did not make them because I think technical intelligence is going to replace human intelligence. That's not the case. It's a false conclusion of the press to jump to because I am not reducing anybody in the overseas components of the Directorate of Operations which does our overseas human intelligence collection efforts. I'm cutting overhead in the Headquarters and it's been well announced--everybody has known this--that we've tried to do it in as fair and humane a way as we can. I would only say in conclusion that I'm so delighted that the media of this country, after three or four years of intense criticism of the Central Intelligence Agency, is now coming to its defense and worried that it's going to be too small.

- Q. With regard to the pirated microwave messages you said that hijackers and other people have access to. How serious is this? What can be done about it?
- A. A number of things can be done about it. The most simple one is to encrypt it all. Another is to be careful that you don't discuss material that you don't want shared with the general public on unsecure telephone lines. Another is to take as much of your important transmissions as possible and take it off the microwave and onto a cable. We are working in all kinds of those directions.
- Q. (Unintelligible but relates to WASHINGTON POST article on drug testing.)
- A. I stated publicly before the Congress to the extent that the CIA at any time in its history did testing of drugs unwittingly on human beings is abhorrent to me. We do not do it now. Any research in that category that we sponsor is worked through the Department of Health, Education and Welfare for its approval. Let me also put into perspective two things: The program really ended in the 1960s--there were little tail-offs that did not involve human beings at a later period; and secondly, there's a historical matter. The attitudes and standards of our country were different then and we're judging now against today's outlook and I think we've got to put it into some perspective like that. Secondly, let me say, overall ARTICHOKE, MKULTRA, that whole series of problems are almost entirely something that you and I would still stand for today--very good research--very well motivated and properly done. There were a few excesses that I say I abhorred but the bulk of it was not.

- Q. Is the CIA working with SAVAK here or in Amman, and if so what is the purpose?
- A. We lived on arrangements with many intelligence organizations around the world where we share information; we're helping each other in collecting foreign intelligence against third parties within the Communist Bloc. We do not have any arrangements with SAVAK, KCIA or anyone else that permits them to do things in this country in exchange for our doing anything else anywhere. That is not part of our arrangement and we would not tolerate anything of that nature.
- Q. There have been reports of links between the CIA and the Shah of Iran. What relationships exist now between the Shah of Iran's country and ours?
- A. I think I just answered that question as best and as fully as I can. We do have liaison relationships with numerous foreign intelligence organizations and they are of mutual benefit to us and in no way compromise the American standards and values and privacy.
- Q. The Japanese news agency a couple of days ago confirmed that the Soviet Union has been working on a satellite destroyer. What information do you have with regard to the Soviet program in that area?
- A. No question the Soviets have been testing an anti-satellite device and the question of how operational it is at this time is difficult to define or to disclose. But they have been conducting tests over a number of years. The tests have intensified somewhat in the last year and a half. So they are clearly moving to achieve that capability.

- Q. Are the COSMOS satellites that they seem to launch every month at least--are they being used to target these programs?
- A. I'm not sure which satellites are being used for the targets by name. Yes, they put up a target satellite and they put up a killer satellite and they simulate destruction.
- Q. Can you confirm that Japanese news agency report? Have they killed another satellite?
- A. I can only confirm what I told you. The Secretary of Defense made a similar statement about two or three weeks ago on that. It also said that they had been conducting this test. Some of the tests are successful; some of them are not--as in any test program. I don't think you can wave from that.
- Q. Will we develop a similar program?
- A. Will we? That's the Defense Department's problem and they have made a statement on that which I think does indicate they are developing an anti-satellite. But I really don't want to get into that because I'm only here to talk about foreign intelligence, not U.S. programs.
- Q. Admiral, why did you decide to hold a news conference here in Chicago?
- A. Because I believe that the Intelligence Community must be more open, more forthright with the American public today and therefore I'm here to make a speech, several speeches. I'm trying to do that as my time permits around the country, and when you come to a major center of media operations like this, I think it is only desirable from your point of view and mine that I try to share with you what I can within the limits of our secrecy. But I think today there is more that we can do to share with the American public. We have produced a lot of unclassified studies

in the last six months on Soviet economy, world energy situation, world steel market situation and we're doing this with deliberate intent to try to help the American public be better informed and to benefit by the taxes that they put into our operations. At the same time I hope it will keep us in closer touch with the American public and its value and standards because if we do not operate intelligence in this country in ways that conform with those ethical values and standards we're not doing our job.

Q. Is this new openness a directive from the President?

A. Yes. Part of the overall policy that Carter announced before he became President even.

Q. What is the main thrust of your speech?

A. You just heard it--just part of it. It's to talk about the new model of American intelligence which is different, in my opinion, than the old traditional model of intelligence. The old model said that intelligence agencies should preserve maximum secrecy--we should operate with minimum supervision. The new model, which I think conforms to the standards, outlook and culture of America, has more openness as our society is open. And it has more supervision as we have checks and balances built into our governmental process. Now don't let me overstate this--we must have secrecy. You cannot conduct intelligence without secrecy. But we're trying in these studies we've produced publicly to review what we do and say, can it be made public without doing harm to the country's interests and when it can we'll publish and when we can we'll tell you about the process of intelligence. But there are some things we can't tell you--the names of agents, exact techniques of various collection devices, but we can tell you, for instance, that a very large part of intelligence is not a clandestine spying-type operation.

It is what you would term at any normal university or any major corporation as research. We have lots of analysts who research and take the pieces of intelligence and pull them together into a picture puzzle and try to evaluate it and give our decisionmakers in this country a better basis for making their decisions.

Q. (Unintelligible.)

A. I don't think we can change the American standards and jeopardize the values for which we stand to accommodate lesser standards of other people. I don't believe that it is necessary in this new openness and morality to get to a level of ineffectiveness that will endanger the country. It is always a very difficult judgmental decision to be made here and part of what the President has sought and directed in a recent reorganization of the Intelligence Community is a proper balance between more oversight and yet preservation of secrecy. It is a difficult balance that has to be worked out carefully. We are doing that and I'm confident that it is going to come out well but I'll tell you very sincerely I think it will take several years to do it. It will take several years to work out these procedures. For instance, with the new intelligence oversight committees in the Congress. Senator Stevenson of our state is a member of the Senate Committee and Representative McClory of Lake Forest is a member of the House Committee. We work very closely with those people today in establishing the rules that will govern our judgments on what the country's willing to do--what risks we're willing to take to get information that is not available to open sources.

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- Q. In relation to that, the amount of work that is going to be done with the members of the intelligence staff. Obviously when they make an approach to Capitol Hill many people become involved in an information process; the staff assistants, the secretaries, etc. That information could go through different facilities; how are you going to keep it limited?
- A. We've not had major problems thus far. We make a judgment on each piece of information we pass. Sometimes we have to narrow it down and have one or two staff members only to the council to the committee. Sometimes we have no staff members. We have to treat it in accordance with the delicacy of the information. We have to feel our way into this relationship so that they are comfortable with what we're giving them and we're comfortable that it isn't going to leak out. There are two risks in this whole operation of being more open and being under more supervisory control. The first is the risk of timidity. That we make at least common denominator intelligence that we may be unwilling to take risks. The second is the risk you pointed out of leaks from the number of people involved. I believe that we have and are developing an adequate balance between the risk-taking of timidity or leaks and that level of oversight that will give us assurance against abuse, assurances in performing in the way the country wants. I'm pleased and confident at the direction we're moving and I think they will let us keep the secrecy we need and at the same time perform only in ways that will strengthen our society rather than weaken it.

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ADDRESS BY ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER, USN

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

CHICAGO COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

14 NOVEMBER 1977

It is really a great treat to be here and I most appreciate your asking me to be with you to talk about what we are doing in the world of intelligence to serve you and to serve the country better. We're reshaping the intelligence structure of your country. President Carter directed a major effort in this direction in February and after six months of scrutiny and close study, in August the President issued directives to make changes in the way we are organized. And as a result of this, we are starting an evolution today toward what I would call a new model of intelligence--an American model. This model contrasts with the old or traditional model in which intelligence organizations always operated in a cloak of maximum secrecy while attempting to operate with minimum of supervision. We hope today to develop a new model which is built to conform with American standards and culture. On the one hand it will be more open as our society is; on the other hand it will be more controlled with a system of checks and balances which characterize our governmental process. So I thought it might be of interest to you today if I discussed some of the actions we're taking to move toward this new model.

The President's directive of last August had two fundamental tenets in it. The first was to strengthen control over the entire intelligence apparatus of our country, thereby hoping to promote greater effectiveness. The second tenet was to assure stringent oversight control thereby increasing accountability.

Now, let me point out that I am the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, but this is only one of the many intelligence agencies of the government. There are intelligence activities, of course, resident in the Department of Defense, Department of State, Treasury, FBI, and even the new Department of Energy. But I am also

the Director of Central Intelligence. And in that capacity my task is to coordinate, bring together into one effective, harmonious operation the activities of all of these intelligence organizations.

The reorganization the President directed in August strengthens my hand in that regard in two very specific ways. It gave me full authority over the budgets of all of these intelligence activities I've enumerated and secondly, it gave me full authority to direct the tasking--the day-to-day operations of these organizations. This should enable me to better control, to coordinate this total effort of collecting intelligence, analyzing and producing it. And this is really what was intended, in my opinion, in the National Security Act of 1947 which first established the Central Intelligence Agency.

Some of the media have portrayed this as a creation of a dangerous and potential intelligence czar and I think this represents a misunderstanding of the intelligence process as such. Let me explain that intelligence is divided into two separate functions. The first is collecting information and that is the costliest and riskiest of our operations. Here you want good control. Here you want to be sure there is a minimum of overlap because it's very costly and to be sure there is a minimum of possibility of a gap in what you are collecting--because that can be very costly in a different manner. And only centralized control, in my opinion, will ensure this collection effort is well coordinated. The second half of intelligence--on college campuses it would be called research--is analysis, estimating, pulling all the little pieces of information that are obtained by the collectors into a puzzle and trying to make a picture of it. Trying to give the decision-makers, the policymakers of our country a better basis upon which to make those decisions.

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Now let me make it clear that I do not, under this new reorganizations, control the people who do all this analysis. I control those in the CIA but there is a strong analytic capability in the Department of Defense and again in the Department of State and our quest is to see to it that there is competitive, overlapping analyses. The Department of State specializes in political interpretation with a second suit in economics. The Department of Defense specializes in military with a second suit in political. The CIA covers the waterfront. So we have assurance that there will be divergent views come forward if they are warranted. And we encourage that and we want to be sure that the decisionmakers don't get just one point of view when several are justified.

Just let me remind you that should I try to be a czar, should I try to shortchange the dissenting and minority views, there is a Cabinet officer in the Department of Defense and a Cabinet officer in the Department of State who manage those intelligence analytic operations and if I try to run roughshod over them, I'm sure those Cabinet officers are not going to fail to take advantage of the access they have to get their amendments forward. So we are not trying to setup a centralized control over the important interpretive process, but over the collecting process. And I sincerely believe that this new organizational arrangement is going to assure better performance in both collecting and interpreting our intelligence for this country.

The fact that the President, Vice President and many other top officials spent so much time in working on this new reorganization, I believe is indicative of a keen awareness throughout the top echelons of our government that good intelligence is perhaps more important to our country today than in any time since the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency thirty years ago.

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You remember thirty years ago we, of course, had absolute military superiority. Since then the failure of the Soviets to make their system grow adequately in other areas of the military has led them to accent that particular competition. They have, I believe, achieved a position of reasonable parity in most areas of the military. That makes the value of our intelligence product much more important. When you know your enemy's potential and something of his intentions, you can use your forces to much greater advantage. Now, he doesn't give that information away but we can pick up pieces here and pieces there and over a long period of time you can bring that together. It gives your military commanders a sense of leverage for their somewhat equal forces.

Now, let's look past the military scene. Thirty years ago we were also a very dominant and independent economic power. Today we are in an era of economic interdependence, a growing interdependence, and the impact on our economy of events of other economies is more and more apparent. And here, too, I believe we desperately need good intelligence in order to make sure that we don't lose our shirt in the international economic arena.

Also, on the political side, thirty years ago we were the dominant political influence in the world. Today even some of the most pipsqueak nations insist on a totally independent course of action. They go their own way and they don't want to be dictated to by Soviets or ourselves. Here again we must be smart, we must understand the attitudes, the cultures, the outlooks, the policies of these countries so that we are not outmaneuvered in this process.

Now at the same time that we are trying to produce better intelligence in all three of these fields we must, of course, be very careful that we do not undermine the principles, the standards of our country in the process of so doing. Thus, the second leg of the President's

new policy--which is better oversight. Some of the mechanisms to conduct that oversight are, first, the keen and regular participation by both the President and the Vice President in the intelligence process. I can assure you they are both very much on top of it. But beyond that, we have a formalized procedure now in the intelligence oversight committees in the Congress. We have a committee called the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and we are working very well with it. Our own Senator, Adlai Stevenson, is a member of that Committee and I really enjoy working with him. But we have the relationship here of closeness but yet aloofness. Closeness in that I feel very free in going to them for help and advice, particularly when I'm involved with other committees of the Congress and there may be boundaries that are being encroached upon. But aloofness in that I very definitely report to them when they call and want to know what we are doing and how we're doing it and why. It is a good oversight procedure.

The House of Representatives last August set up a corresponding committee. Representative McClory from Lake Forest is a member of that and a very fine and active one. And we hope and are sure that that relationship will develop as has the one with the Senate.

Beyond this we have oversight in what is known as the Intelligence Oversight Board, comprised of three distinguished Americans; ex-Senator Gore, Ex-Governor Scranton, and Mr. Tom Farmer, a lawyer from Washington. They are appointed by the President. Their only task is to oversee the legality and the propriety of our intelligence operations. They report only to the President. Anyone may go to them, bypassing me, saying, look, that fellow Turner is doing something dastardly or somebody else in the Intelligence Community is doing something he shouldn't be doing. The Board will look into it and let the President know whether they think he should do something in response.

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Now let me be perfectly clear and perfectly honest with you. There are risks to the oversight process. The first is that of timidity, I would say. Timidity in that it's easy when you're overseeing something to decide not to take a risk, not to take a chance and we could fail to do things that may be very important to the long-term benefit of our country. It may put avoidance of current risk over gaining of long-term benefits. And secondly the risk of security leaks. The more you proliferate the number of people involved in sensitive secret intelligence operations, the more danger there is of some inadvertent leak of release. I am confident at this time that we are moving to establish that right balance between the amount of oversight and the amount of danger that it entails. But it will be two or three years before we shake this process out--before we establish just how those relationships are going to exist. And in that time, in that process, we are going to need the understanding and support of the Congress and that, of course, means the support and understanding of the American people.

Accordingly, we are now reappraising the traditional outlook toward secrecy, toward relationships with the public and we are adopting a policy of more openness, more forthrightness in the hope that we can do this at the same time as we ensure preservation of that secrecy which is absolutely fundamental. As a first step we've tried to be more accessible to the American media. We have appeared on GOOD MORNING AMERICA, 60 MINUTES, TIME magazine and also we respond more readily now to inquiries from the media. We try to give substantive, meaningful answers whenever we can within the limits of our necessary secrecy.

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But perhaps more interesting to you who are so concerned with international affairs of this country, we are also today trying to share more of the product of our intelligence efforts-- more of the analyses, the estimates, the studies that we do. In fact, we have a policy that when we do a study and it comes out secret, top secret, or destroy before reading or whatever we may label it, we try to reduce it down to an unclassified form and ask ourselves the question, "Will this product still be useful to the American public?" If it is, we feel we have an obligation to print it and publish it. We are doing that to the maximum extent we can.

You have heard of our study last March on the world energy outlook. We've recently done one on the world steel prospects, whether there is over-capacity and what the expected demand is. We've done studies and published them on the Chinese and Soviet energy prospects. And under the aegis of the Joint Economic Committee of Congress last July we published one on the outlook for the Soviet economy itself.

Let me describe that just very briefly to give you the flavor of what we think we can put out in unclassified form what we hope to be of value to you and other Americans and perhaps help improve the general quality and tenor of American debate of major issues affecting our country. Previously, CIA has looked at the Soviet economy and felt that generally it had a capability to achieve three things; to sustain the level of military growth that they were trying to do to catch up with us generally; to make improvements if not spectacular improvements, in the quality of life inside the Soviet Union; and to sustain enough investment to carry on a generally growing economy. Our most recent study reexamines these premises and comes to the conclusion that the outlook for the Soviets is perhaps more bleak today in the economic sphere than at any time since the death of Stalin.

This is based on our belief that the Soviets have maintained their levels of productivity over these many years primarily by infusing large quantities of labor and capital and we think they are coming to a dead end here. For instance, in the 1960s they had a very big drop in their birth rate. In the 1980s the rate of growth of their labor force is going to drop markedly from about 1.5 percent to about .5 percent. They are not going to be able to find the additional labor to go into increases, keep up their productivity. A lot of the growth of their labor force also today is coming from the central Asian areas of the Soviet Union where they just don't like to go on into the big cities.

Secondly, as far as investment is concerned--capital--their resources are becoming more scarce and more difficult to obtain. They're having to reach for minerals further into the Siberian wasteland which is costly. They can't bring in as much as they have before, particularly in the area of petroleum where we have made this forecast that their emphasis in recent years on current production has been at the expense of developing reserves and new supplies.

Now if you look carefully at the Soviet's five-year development plan you'll see that they are the ones who predict they are not going to be able to make the same infusions of capital and labor as they have in the past. They, however, do come to the conclusion that somehow and nonetheless they are going to increase productivity. We don't think that is in the cards. We see no sign of increasing efficiency, no sign of any willingness to become less shackled to their economic doctrines which are harnessing them back. Instead, we think the Soviets in the years ahead between now and the early 1980s are going to be faced with some difficult pragmatic choices. One may be a debate over the size, the amount of investment in their

armed forces. Clearly, this is one avenue to find labor and capital. Another may be over whether they will continue to fulfill their promises for the delivery of oil to the Eastern European satellites. Will they be able to afford doing this when it becomes more and more difficult for them to obtain hard currency. And the third may be, what are they going to do to obtain the necessary foreign exchange to sustain the rate of infusion of American and Western technology and equipment which they are currently depending upon to increase and improve their economic position. Interestingly, when they face these and other decisions there is a high probability that they are going to be in the midst of a major leadership change. It could be a very difficult time and situation for them. It may go very smoothly--we just can't tell.

One of the important points that comes out of all this is that we believe as they make these policy decisions it's not going to be remote from you and me--it's going to be important to us. What they do with their armed forces obviously impacts on what we do with ours. What they do with their oil inputs to the Eastern European countries and whether that area remains politically stable is going to have a major impact on the events throughout the European scene. If there is too much competition for energy because they don't produce what they need, what is that going to do to the overall world prices of petroleum? If they enter the money markets in an attempt to borrow more from us and others in the West, what is going to be our response? What is going to be our policy in that regard?

Now let me say that when we produce a study like this we are not so confident that we don't want to have a good debate with the others in the American public as to the quality of what we've done. And therefore we find that publishing these studies is also helping us to maintain a good dialogue with the American public. When we did the

-10-

oil study last March, for instance, and it received criticism from the press, we wrote to professors, to oil companies, to think tanks who had come out with criticisms and we said, "Detail those for us--we'd like to have them." When they did we invited them to come into the Agency and discuss them with us and we had some very interesting and stimulating dialogues of the results. It's very beneficial to us to publish these studies as well, I hope, as to the American public. We hope as more of them come off the press we will have more dialogue with the business community and with academia.

Let me assure you, however, while we're on this subject of openness, that we cannot and we will not open up everything. There clearly must be a degree of intelligence that remains secret. Some of the information behind the Soviet oil and economic studies clearly was derived from very sensitive sources. They would dry up if we made them known. Thus, we can't forget that while we're moving ahead with this dialogue with the public and trying to build up more public understanding and respect for what we do in defense of our country, we must also obtain the public understanding for preserving that level of secrecy which is essential for these activities. In short, we're moving in two directions at once today. On the one hand, we're opening up more, but in that process we expect to obtain greater secrecy for what remains classified. When too much is classified it is not respected and not well treated. The other direction we're moving is simply to tighten the noose of security around those things which must be kept secret.

What I'm really saying in summary is that we're trying to develop a model of intelligence uniquely tailored to this country, which on the one hand balances an increased emphasis on openness with a preservation of that necessary secrecy where it truly is necessary.

-11-

And the model which also combines an emphasis on continued effectiveness in getting the job done and obtaining that information which our policymakers require while on the other hand exercising effective control. I am confident that while this model is still evolving it is moving in a direction in which we can preserve the necessary secrecy while at the same time conducting our necessary intelligence operations only in a way which will in the long run strengthen our open and free society.

Thank you very much.

-END-

CROSS INDEX

ORE 1 Council on Foreign Relations
(Houston)

For additional information on the above, see:

FILES

DATES

CIA 1.01 Turner, Adm. Trip file

31 Jan - 6 Feb 78

Council on Foreign Relations

N.Y.

Orig 1 Council on
Foreign Relations

5 October 77

6 October 1977

Mr. Zygmunt Nagorski
Council on Foreign Relations
The Harold Pratt House
58 East 68th Street
New York, New York 10021

Dear Mr. Nagorski:

Just a short note to send along
some recent declassified Central Intelli-
gence Agency publications.

It was a pleasure meeting you last
night--our visit to the Foreign Relations
Council was most enjoyable.

All the best.

Sincerely,

Herbert E. Hetu

Enclosures

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INC.

Meeting in honor of

ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER, USN
Director of Central Intelligence

SECRECACY AND MORALITY IN INTELLIGENCE

Wednesday, October 5, 1977
5:15-6:30 pm

McGeorge Bundy
President, The Ford Foundation
Presiding

STAT

Herb Hetu

Admiral Turner's Personal Staff

Admiral Turner's Personal Staff

AS A COURTESY TO THE SPEAKER
MEMBERS ARE REQUESTED TO REMAIN UNTIL THE TERMINATION OF THE SESSION
THE MEETING WILL END PROMPTLY AT 6:30 PM

Members and Staff of the Council

Elie Abel
Robert J. Alexander
F. Alley Allan
Charles Allen
James B. Alley
Graham T. Allison
Richard C. Allison
Arthur G. Altschul
Norbert L. Anschuetz
Anne Armstrong
William Attwood

William B. Bader
Charles W. Bailey, II
Charles F. Baird
Robert R. Barker
Deborah Barron
Whitman Bassow
Philip Bastedo
Alan Batkin
Louis Begley
Robert Bernstein
John P. Birkelund

To encourage forthright discussion in Council meetings, it is a rule of the Council that participants will not subsequently attribute to other participants, or ascribe to a Council meeting, any statements that are made in the course of the meeting.

Joseph E. Black
Stephen Blank
John A. Blum
Richard Blystone
Robert Bond
J. Dennis Bonney
Dudley B. Bonsal
Paul J. Braisted
Henry C. Breck
Henry R. Breck
Donald G. Brennan
Lorna Brennan
Mitchell Brock
George P. Brockway
Judith Bruce
John C. Bullitt
William A. M. Burden
Benjamin J. Bittenwieser

William D. Carmichael
James Chace
W. Howard Chase
Patricia Hewitt Christensen
Robert C. Christopher
Edgar M. Church
Kenneth B. Clark
Harlan Cleveland
Richard M. Clurman
James S. Coles
Emilio G. Collado
Sydney M. Cone, III
John T. Connor, Jr.
Donald Cordes
Norman Cousins
Gardner Cowles
Winthrop Crane
Robert D. Crassweller

Charles F. Darlington
Eli Whitney Debevoise
Jose de Cubas
Christopher DeMuth
Charles S. Dennison
Lucy Despard
Thomas J. Devine
Henry P. de Vries
Bita Dobo
Arnold Dolin
J. R. Drumwright
James H. Duffy
Kempton Dunn

Julius C. C. Edelstein
Irving M. Engel
John Exter

Larry L. Fabian
Mark C. Feer
Mary Frances Fenner
Glenn W. Ferguson
Thomas K. Finletter
Paul B. Finney
Joseph G. Fogg
Nevil Ford
Doris Forest
Joseph C. Fox
Albert Francke, III
George S. Franklin, Jr.
Gerald Freund
Henry J. Friendly
Alton Frye
William R. Frye
Stephen Fuzesi, Jr.

Robert Gard
Murray Gart
Richard L. Garwin
Patrick Gerschel
Patsy Gesell
William T. Golden
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Maurice R. Greenberg
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Peter Grimm

Najeeb E. Halaby
Morton H. Halperin
George Hampsch
Selig Harrison
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H. J. Heinz, II
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J. C. Hurewitz

Zygmunt Nagorski
Clifford C. Nelson
Rodney W. Nichols
Richard Nolte

John K. Jessup
William Josephson

Alfred Ogden
Michael J. O'Neill
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Natalie Lombard
Winston Lord
Edward C. Luck
David L. Luke, III

Leonard V. Quigley

John J. McCloy
Elizabeth McCormack
Walsh McDermott
Bruce K. MacLaury
Robert Macy
August Maffry
Bayless Manning
John Masten
Lawrence A. Mayer
Dana G. Mead
John Merow
Herbert E. Meyer
Drew Middleton
John Millington
Leo Model
Judith H. Monson
Jan Murray
Forrest D. Murden
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Jay B. L. Reeves
Michael M. Reisman
Marshall A. Robinson
Jane Rosen
T. W. Russell, Jr.
Dankwart A. Rustow

Mildred Sage
Richard E. Salomon
Howland Sargeant
John E. Sawyer
Warner R. Schilling
Enid Schoettle
Harry Schwartz
Nancie Schwartz
Stuart N. Scott
John O. B. Sewall
Ronald K. Shelp
Walter V. Shipley
Benjamin R. Shute
Laurence H. Silberman
Adele Smith Simmons
Datus C. Smith, Jr.

Theodore C. Sorensen
Elinor Spalten
Kenneth Spang
John H. Spencer
Harold E. Stassen
James H. Stebbins
Daniel Steiner
Charles R. Stevens
J. B. Sunderland
James S. Sutterlin
Francis X. Sutton
Eric Swenson
John Temple Swing
Stanley M. Swinton

Arthur R. Taylor
William J. Taylor, Jr.
Evan Thomas
Martin B. Travis
Barbara Tuchman
Maurice Tempelsman

Robert Valkenier
Sandra Vogelgesang
Paul A. Volcker
Alfred H. Von Klemperer

William Walker
T. F. Walkowicz
Martha R. Wallace
Bethuel M. Webster
George B. Weiksner
Jasper A. Welch, Jr.
Richard W. Wheeler
Taggart Whipple
Donald M. Wilson
John D. Wilson
Henry S. Wingate
Philip S. Winterer

Donna Ecton Young

Ezra K. Zilkha

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Trip bill
H

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INC.

THE HAROLD PRATT HOUSE | 58 EAST 68TH STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10021 | TEL. (212) 734-0400 | CABLE: COUNFOREL, NEW YORK

The Thomas J. Watson Meetings

You are cordially invited to attend

A Meeting

in honor of

ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER, USN
Director of Central Intelligence

at the Harold Pratt House

Wednesday, October 5, 1977
5:15-6:30 pm

SECREC Y AND MORALIT Y IN INTELLIGENCE

McGeorge Bundy
President, The Ford Foundation
will preside

MEMBERS ACCEPTING THIS INVITATION WILL BE EXPECTED TO STAY UNTIL THE END OF THE SESSION.

MEMBERS ARRIVING AFTER 5:30 ARE REQUESTED TO REMAIN IN THE MARBLE HALL

*For
your
information*

Washington, D.C. 20505

Executive Registry
27-1288/1A

7 July 1977


Dear Zyg,

Thanks so much for the invitation to address the New York Council on Foreign Relations. I accept with pleasure.

I understand my staff has been in touch and Wednesday afternoon, 5 October, is amenable to all. My staff will continue to be in touch with you to coordinate the final details.

Thank you again for the invitation and I look forward to meeting you in October.

Yours sincerely,



STANSFIELD TURNER

Mr. Zygmunt Nagorski
Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.
The Harold Pratt House
58 East 68th Street
New York, New York 10021

THE HAROLD PRATT HOUSE | 58 EAST 65TH STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10021 | TEL. (212) 734-0400

CABLE: COUNFOREL, NEW YORK

The Thomas J. Watson Meetings
ZYGMUNT NAGORSKI, Director

March 21, 1977


Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Stan:

Your appearance on "Face the Nation" yesterday once again whetted my appetite. Could we firm up a date to have you visit the Council sometime next October-November so that we could have a date reserved on both of our calendars?

The formulating of a subject and other logistics we can leave until a later date.

Sincerely,



Zygmunt Nagorski

ZN.es

Very respectfully,

B

DATE RECEIVED: 10 May 77

DATE OF EVENT: last week, Dec 77

1. INFORMATION REGARDING THE APPOINTMENT:

- a. Source: Tel:(212) 734-0400 Ltr Fm: Mr. Zygmunt Nagorski
- b. Type of event: Council on Foreign Relations meeting
- c. Special occasion: Asks DCI to speak
- d. Date/Time: last week in December 77
- e. Location: NYC
- f. Significant info: The meeting is held for college age sons and daughters of Council members.

2. SCHEDULE:

--	--	--	--	--	--	--

3. RECOMMENDATIONS:

	Schedule	Regret	Remarks
AIDE			
PAO			
EA			

4. DCI DECISION:

- a. SCHEDULE _____ NO _____ SEE ME _____
- b. ADDITIONAL ATTENDEES _____
- c. PASS TO: DDCI _____ D/DCI/IC _____ D/DCI/NI _____ OTHER _____

5. AIDE FINAL ACTION: _____

77-1288

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INC.

THE HAROLD PRATT HOUSE 58 EAST 68TH STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10021 | TEL. (212) 734-0400 | CABLE: COUNTOREL, NEW YORK

The Thomas J. Watson Meetings
ZYGMUNT NAGORSKI, Director

May 3, 1977

Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Stan:

Following on our earlier correspondence, I want to explore with you an idea which I hope you will find acceptable.

Every year during the Christmas college vacation, the Council holds a meeting to which members may bring their college age sons and daughters. The purpose is to expose young people to the kind of intellectual climate which exists at the Council. It also gives them access to people they usually do not have the opportunity to meet. The thought occurred to me that in view of the crisis in confidence which has developed over the years between younger Americans and the intelligence community, you might want to be our annual speaker for the occasion. A topic related to the role of intelligence in an open society would perhaps be an appropriate one for the meeting.

Please let me know if you would consider this invitation favorably. This meeting is usually held during the last week in December.

With kind regards,

Sincerely,


Zygmunt Nagorski

ZN.es

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

7 September 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/NI

FROM: James R. Lilley
National Intelligence Officer for China

SUBJECT: Invitation to Speak on China to
Council on Foreign Relations

This is to amend my memo of 26 July 1976 (copy attached).
The Council on Foreign Relations has asked me to speak in
Tampa Bay Florida rather than in Louisville on 28 September.
I have accepted this change.

James R. Lilley

STAT

Attachment:

As stated

NIO/CH-JRLilley:fmt

7 September 1976

Distribution:

- Orig. & 1 - Addressee, w/att.
1 - Asst. to DCI, w/att.
1 - D/Sec., w/att.
1 - C/CCS, w/att.
2 - NIO/CH, w/att.
1 - NIO/RI, w/att.

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

26 July 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/NI

VIA: Assistant to the DCI
Director of Security
Chief, Central Cover Staff


SUBJECT: Invitation to Speak on China to
Council on Foreign Relations

1. Rolland Bushner, Program Director of the Council on Foreign Relations, has invited me to speak before the Nashville Committee on Foreign Relations which is affiliated with the Council. He would like me to speak on Developments in China. As is the custom with the Council my remarks will be on a not-for-attribution basis and there will not be publicity.

2. Mr. Bushner has suggested that my talk at Nashville take place at a date of my choice after mid September 1976. He has also asked that I consider speaking before several other committees such as those in Louisville, Indianapolis and St. Louis.

3. I propose that I accept his offer to speak in Nashville on 27 September and Louisville on the 28th of September. If these go well and we believe it worthwhile, I can return later to talk at Indianapolis and St. Louis.

4. I will use some classified data through Confidential but will blend it in to my talk.


James R. Lilley
National Intelligence Officer
for China

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

26 July 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/NI

VIA: Assistant to the DCI
Director of Security
Chief, Central Cover Staff


SUBJECT: Invitation to Speak on China to
Council on Foreign Relations

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4. I will use some classified data through Confidential but will blend it in to my talk.


James R. Lilley
National Intelligence Officer
for China

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December 23, 1975

Mr. Rolland Bushner
Director
Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.
58 East 68th Street
New York, New York 10021

Dear Mr. Bushner,

Thank you very much for your kind letter about the possibility of speaking at Charlottesville on January 10th. I am afraid I must regret that I cannot undertake this engagement, as I have some other plans for that day. I do appreciate your thinking of me, however, and thank you for passing the word along.

Sincerely,

/s/ W. E. Colby

W. E. Colby
Director

WEC:lm (23 Dec 75)

Distribution:

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1 - DCI (w/Basic)
1 - Asst/DCI
1 - ER

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28 Feb 75 Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200330001-9

Mr. Bushner, Council for Foreign Relations, NY

Called us to remind that Mr. Colby was going to address San Francisco Committee on Foreign Relations last December, but that he called it off and promised to reconsider later. Would DCI accept now?

← dinner →
db

25X1

31 December 1974

Mr. Bayless Manning
President
Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.
58 East 68th Street
New York, New York 10021

Dear Mr. Manning:

Please let me supplement my letter accepting your kind invitation for membership with one expressing my appreciation for your letter of December 27th. I understand your concern over the breach of the house rules, but I assure you that the incident does not in any way reduce my high opinion of the Council and its membership. This kind of slip must be accepted as a part of our life style today, and it is my responsibility in any event to avoid divulging classified information outside authorized channels. Thus, please let me thank you for your letter but assure you that it will in no way restrict my willingness to speak before the Council on future occasions if I am ever asked.

Sincerely,

/s/ W. E. Colby

W. E. Colby
Director

WEC:jlpl (31 Dec 74)

Distribution:

Original - Addressee

1 - DCI w/basic

1 - ER

1 - Mr. Thurman (given to him 8 Jan 75)

THU 8 15 1975

EB

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74-7241

THE HAROLD PRATT HOUSE | 58 EAST 68TH STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10021 | TEL. (212) 535-3300 | CABLE: COUNFOREL, NEW YORK

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

December 27, 1974


Dear Mr. Colby:

I am enclosing for you a copy of a letter I have sent today to all Council members who attended the meeting and dinner with you on December 16.

The letter speaks for itself. But I wanted to let you know personally, and on behalf of the Council, how sorry we are for the breach of our house rules that followed your talk. I can only assure you that we know of only two or three such infractions that have occurred in the entire 52 year history of the Council and that our non-attribution representations made to you in our invitation to speak here were made in the best of good faith.

It is an odd quirk of timing that I should be compelled to write an apology to you just after sending you the board's invitation to become a Council member. Despite the inauspicious circumstances, I hope we can look forward to your acceptance of Council membership.

Very truly yours,



Mr. William E. Colby
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

BM/jg
encl.

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JOHN TEMPLE SWING
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COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

THE HAROLD PRATT HOUSE | 58 EAST 68TH STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10021 | TEL. (212) 535-3300 | CABLE: COUNFOREL, NEW YORK

BAYLESS MANNING
President

December 27, 1974

Dear Council Member:


I write to report to you, as one of those who attended the December 16 meeting at which the Council's guest was Mr. William Colby, that a recent article in the New York Times attributes certain statements to Mr. Colby and identifies them as having been made at the Council meeting.

As you know, while meeting participants are of course encouraged to draw freely on the increased understanding that comes from Council discussions, in order to encourage forthright expression it is a rule of the Council that participants will not subsequently attribute to other participants statements made in the course of a Council meeting, nor identify the source as having been a Council meeting.

The Council's non-attribution rule is regularly brought to the attention of persons invited to speak here. There is reason to believe that the rule and its observance are important considerations in the ability of the Council to attract outstanding speakers and that they contribute to the willingness of visitors to speak freely. The rule is also, as you know, routinely brought to the attention of Council members at the outset of each meeting and is considered an important factor encouraging uninhibited expressions of opinion by Council members. It is thus of great importance to the Council's program that the non-attribution rule be honored by all Council members.


The recent statements that appeared in the press can only mean that some member or members of the Council have committed a violation of the non-attribution rule. This incident has been a matter of embarrassment to all of us and I have written a letter of apology to Mr. Colby. I hope that this letter, which I am sending to all of the members who attended the meeting on December 16, will serve as an indication of the very serious concern with which this matter is viewed, and an expression of trust that such a breach will not be repeated.

Very truly yours,



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MASSIVE C.I.A. OPERATION REPORTED IN U.S. AGAINST ANTIWAR AND OTHER DISSIDENTS IN NIXON



Richard Helms



James R. Schlesinger



William E. Colby

The New York Times

FILES ON CITIZENS

Helms Reportedly Got Surveillance Data in Charter Violation

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 21—The Central Intelligence Agency, directly violating its charter, conducted a massive illegal domestic intelligence operation during the Nixon Administration against the antiwar movement and other dissident groups in the United States, according to well-placed Government sources.

An extensive investigation by The New York Times has established that intelligence files on at least 10,000 American citizens were maintained by a special unit of the C.I.A. that was reporting directly to Richard Helms, then the Director of Central Intelligence and now the Ambassador to Iran.

In addition, the sources said, a check of the C.I.A.'s domestic files ordered last year by Mr. Helms's successor, James R. Schlesinger, produced evidence of dozens of other illegal activities by members of the C.I.A. inside the United States, beginning in the nineteen-fifties, including break-ins, wiretapping and the surreptitious inspection of mail.

A Different Category

Mr. Schlesinger was succeeded at the C.I.A. by William E. Colby in late 1973.

Those alleged operations, while also prohibited by law, were not targeted at dissident American citizens, the sources said, but were a different category of domestic activities that were secretly carried out as part of operations aimed at suspected foreign intelligence agents operating in the United States.

Under the 1947 act setting up the C.I.A., the agency was forbidden to have "police, subpoena, law enforcement powers or internal security functions" inside the United States. Those responsibilities fall to the F.B.I., which has a special internal security unit to deal with foreign intelligence threats.

Mr. Helms, who left the C. I. A. in February, 1973, for his new post in Teheran, could not be reached despite telephone calls there yesterday and today.

Network of Informants

Charles Cline, a duty officer at the American Embassy in Teheran, said today that a note informing Mr. Helms of the request by The Times for comment had been delivered to Mr. Helms's quarters this morning. By late evening Mr. Helms had not returned the call.

"This is explosive, it could destroy the agency," one official with access to details of the alleged domestic spying on dissidents said in an interview.

He described the program as similar in intent to the Army domestic surveillance programs that were censured by Congress four years ago.

"There was no excuse for what the agency did," the source said. "What you had was an insulated secret police agency not under internal question or audit."

ized agents to follow and photograph participants in antiwar and other demonstrations. The C.I.A. also set up a network of informants who were ordered to penetrate antiwar groups, the sources said.

At least one avowedly antiwar member of Congress was among those placed under surveillance by the C.I.A., the sources said. Other members of Congress were said to be included in the C.I.A.'s dossier on dissident Americans.

The names of the various Congressmen could not be learned, nor could any specific information about domestic C.I.A. break-ins and wiretappings be obtained.

It also could not be determined whether Mr. Helms had had specific authority from top aides to initiate the alleged domestic surveillance, or whether Mr. Helms had informed the President of the fruits, if any of the alleged operations.

Distress Reported

These alleged activities are known to have distressed both Mr. Schlesinger, now the Secretary of Defense, and Mr. Colby. Mr. Colby has reportedly told associates that he is considering the possibility of asking the Attorney General to institute legal action against some of those who had been involved in the clandestine domestic activities.

One official, who was directly involved in the latest C.I.A. inquiry last year into the alleged activities, said that Mr. Schlesinger and his associates were unable to learn what Mr. Nixon knew, if any.

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COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

THE HAROLD PRATT HOUSE | 58 EAST 68TH STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10021 | TEL. (212) 512-1200

ROLLAND BUSHNER

Director

Committees on Foreign Relations Program

December 17, 1974

The Honorable William E. Colby
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
McLean, Virginia

Dear Mr. Colby:

The officers of the San Francisco Committee on Foreign Relations were delighted to learn that you had agreed in principle to meet with that group in conjunction with your trip to San Francisco for a luncheon with the Commonwealth Club on January 17. They proposed that you meet with the Committee at dinner on January 16, or if that would not be possible they would suggest a reception from about 5 p.m. to 6:30 p.m. or a luncheon from 12:00 to 1:30 p.m. on the same day. If that would not work and you will be in San Francisco on January 15, a dinner or reception on that day would be another possibility.

Committee meetings are informal and off-the-record like the roundtable dinner that followed the general meeting here at the Council yesterday. As with that group, the wider perspective to be gained from your frank but considered comments to the leaders who belong to the Committee would be reflected widely.

In a few days I shall telephone your secretary, as you suggested, to see where a meeting with this Committee could be fitted into your San Francisco visit.

Sincerely,

Rolland Bushner

Rolland Bushner

*Don't say I performed I told Bushner we
having to postpone San F. appearance*

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JOHN TEMPLE SWING
Vice President and Secretary

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
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<p>Per our telephone conversation, Mr. Colby asked that you get him out of this. As I mentioned, this matter had been raised with the Director when he was at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York.</p> <p>Mr. Bushner followed up his letter with a telephone call to me on Monday, 23 December. At that time, I explained that Mr. Colby had been planning on leaving Washington on Thursday, 16 January, stopping in Ohio at Wright-Patterson and then going on to San Francisco that evening; in this connection, I asked if his meeting with the</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(OVER)</p>					
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Council could be on Friday night, the 17th, rather than on the 16th. He commented that Friday is not usually a good day but he would check it out and be back in touch with me. None of this makes any difference now, but I wanted you to know of his conversation with me.



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MAR 23 1972

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Corporations' secret foreign role faces probe

By Thomas B. Ross
Sun-Times Bureau

WASHINGTON — The Senate Foreign Relations Committee agreed Wednesday to look into the secret role of international corporations in U.S. foreign policy.

But it deferred a decision on whether to order a full-scale staff investigation or to call witnesses from the International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. and other large companies.

After a closed-door meeting with Sec. of State William P. Rogers, Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.), the chairman, said the committee decided only to make a general "study" of the problem.

Several committee members obviously were reluctant to delve too deeply into the explosive issue, despite the revelation by columnist Jack Anderson of confidential ITT memos on its dealings in Chile.

Sen. Frank Church (D-Ida.), chairman of the Latin American subcommittee, urged a full investigation, including testimony from ITT officials.

A number of present and former government officials are understood to have volunteered to provide information on the extensive relationship between the Central Intelligence Agency and U.S. corporations with operations abroad.

If an investigation is launched it would be the second involving ITT at the Capitol. The Senate Judiciary Committee already is conducting an inquiry into Anderson's al-

legations that ITT pressured the administration into an out-of-court settlement of a major antitrust case last year.

Anderson's memos described extensive ITT dealings with the Latin American division of the CIA's Clandestine Services as part of an alleged plot to prevent the installation of leftist Salvador Allende as president of Chile.

The documents also include purported reports on the Chile maneuverings to ITT director John A. McCone, former head of the CIA.

The CIA's efforts to operate through U.S. corporations and other private organizations abroad was the subject of a confidential Council on Foreign Relations report revealed by The Sun-Times last September.

The report, based on a secret discussion among several former ranking CIA officials in 1968, declared: "If the agency is to be effective, it will have to make use of private in-

stitutions on an expanding scale. . . . CIA's interface with the rest of the world needs to be better protected. . . .

"It is possible and desirable, although difficult and time-consuming to build overseas an apparatus of unofficial cover. . . . If one deals through U.S. corporations with overseas activities, one can keep most of the (CIA's) bureaucratic staff at home and can deal through the corporate headquarters, perhaps using corporate channels for overseas communications (including classified communications)."

Fulbright described ITT's activities in Chile, as alleged by Anderson, as "very bad business" but "probably a normal course of conduct" for corporations with major investments in a foreign country.

Church said Anderson's charges were "very disturbing (and) suggest our policy may be mainly concerned with the protection of large American companies."

However, he praised the Nixon administration for showing "admirable restraint" in dealing with Allende.

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EDITORIALS

THE SUBVERSIVE C.F.R.

When President Nixon appointed Henry Kissinger as his assistant for national security affairs we pointed out that he was hardly qualified for his job because he was a security risk himself. And we proved it.

Many people thought that we were crazy, or "extremists," to say such nasty things about a man appointed to such a high position by an allegedly "conservative" Republican.

HENRY KISSINGER

is the architect of President Nixon's pro-Red China policy, which has already caused our most massive foreign policy defeat since the recognition of the U.S.S.R. by Roosevelt. He was hand-picked for his job by the subversive Council on Foreign Relations.

The CFR is a private organization which controls our foreign policy. It is itself run for the benefit of the multi-billionaire internationalists who profit from our continuing sellout to communism. They picked Kissinger for Nixon and had Nixon put him in control of our foreign policy because they wanted to be certain that "American" policy continues to be made for their benefit, rather than the benefit of America.

Kissinger has been so successful in doing a job for his bosses in the CFR that on Nov. 6 Nixon signed an order putting him in charge of all intelligence operations—the FBI, CIA, Military Intelligence, Departments of Treasury, Defense, and State, and Atomic Energy intelligence. Now, through Kissinger's National Security Council, the CFR can plug in to meetings of patriots who may be planning to overthrow at the polls the internationalist regime in Washington. Soon, it will be a "crime" to read an editorial like this unless the people wake up. But

THE PEOPLE ARE CATCHING ON

to the fact that the government is in the hands of ruthless pressure group bosses who wish to run our country for their exclusive benefit. They want to steal all your wealth "legally," through confiscatory taxes (the super-rich very seldom pay any taxes at all), inflation and interest on their Federal Reserve Notes, which they force us to use as "money."

A poll reports that in 1964, 62% of the people believed that the government was run for the benefit of all. After Johnson and Nixon that figure is now down to 37%. Which proves that you can't fool all of the people all of the time.

There is only one answer to this. It is to organize a political counter-force and we don't mean the Republican or Democratic party. Both of these are part of the problem and any politician who calls himself either is in some degree controlled. If he's honest, he will admit it.

LIBERTY LOBBY

is the answer—a political force which is completely independent of all pressure groups and parties.

And when we say LIBERTY LOBBY, we don't mean an imitation, such as "Common Cause" or some other phoney organization which has been set up by the CFR to lead you down the road a little further. The CFR-Zionist cabal is expert at setting up this sort of thing to confuse its opposition.

There is plenty of evidence that Nixon's fiasco in the UN and forced busing of kids to integrated schools are waking up the voters as nothing else ever has. Public apathy is giving way to alarm. The people are looking up from their boob tubes and wondering what is going on.

Let's tell them—and let's tell them that there is only one way to fight effectively—LIBERTY LOBBY.

The Council on Foreign Relations

Is It a Club? Seminar?

'Invisible Government'

ON March 26, 1969, eleven places were set for lunch at the oval table in the Council on Foreign Relations' stately meeting room overlooking Park Avenue. The guest list was not quite so distinguished as some from the past, judging by the photographs hanging on the black walnut paneling: Harold Macmillan chatting with Henry Wriston; John Foster Dulles wedged stiffly between John J. McCloy and Averell Harriman; John W. Davis towering over the King of Siam. But for a weekday working lunch, it was an impressive assemblage.

There was Cyrus Vance, recently returned deputy negotiator at the Paris peace talks; Robert Roosa, former Under Secretary of the Treasury; Chester Cooper, former special assistant to Harriman; James Grant, former assistant administrator for Vietnam in the Agency for International Development; Roy Wehrle, former deputy assistant AID administrator for Vietnam; Paul Warnecke, former Assistant Secretary of Defense; Robert Bowie, director of Harvard's Center for International Affairs; Samuel Huntington, professor of government at Harvard; Lucian Pye, professor of political science at M.I.T., and Harry Boardman and David MacEachron, Council staff members.

The lunchers all knew each other. Most had worked together in Government; all except Wehrle were Council members. So they wasted little time on small talk over the soup, plunging right into their subject: an effort to devise a formula that might break the deadlock in Paris. The suggestion that the Council might help evolve such a formula had come from Harriman. Although the Council's staff rejected any formal role, it permitted Boardman to invite appropriate members to a lunch at which the matter might be discussed.

Over the next five weeks, the group met several times at the Council's headquarters at 58 East

66th Street, at the Center for International Affairs in Cambridge and the Cosmos Club in Washington. From its deliberations grew a proposal endorsed by eight members. It envisioned a standstill cease-fire and a division of power based on a recognition of territory controlled by the Saigon Government and the Vietcong—a formula the framers conceded was "rigged" to favor the Government.

In May, the remaining participants met for dinner at the Cosmos Club with Elliott Richardson, then Under Secretary of State, and Henry Kissinger, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (and the Council's most influential member). A participant recalls: "Elliott seemed interested; Henry obviously wasn't, and it's Henry who counts." An official says: "The proposal was received with all the pomp and circumstance accorded a communication from a foreign government, then filed and largely forgotten."

But apparently not completely forgotten. At Richardson's request, Boardman, Cooper, Huntington and Wehrle submitted further elaborations. Vance continued to push the concept with his many influential friends in Washington. For 18 months there was no sign of acceptance. But when President Nixon announced a five-point peace initiative on Oct. 7, 1970, it included the first American call for a standstill cease-fire as a prelude to a political settlement based on "the existing relationship of political forces in South Vietnam." Although many aspects of the Council group's plan were clearly absent, the concepts bore sufficient similarity that a year later Cyrus Vance could say, "I think we had some influence."

THE "peace initiative," although in some respects unusual, illustrates the intricate fashion in which the powerful men who make up the Council still influence the develop-

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that it does—then it is the influence its members bring to bear through such channels.

In an age when most traditional institutions are being challenged, the network of influence the Council symbolizes is increasingly coming under attack. Critics, within and without, are asking whether America can any longer afford such a cozy, clubby approach to the making of foreign policy. In recent months, the attack has focused on the appointment of William Bundy — a leading member of the "club," but also a prime implementer of a discredited Vietnam policy—as editor of the Council's journal, *Foreign Affairs*. But the challenge goes well beyond the Bundy appointment. And, ironically, as the Council's leadership moves to head it off by admitting younger, dissident members, it only intensifies the internal debate. In months to come, the organization that has coolly analyzed power struggles in the Kremlin and Leopoldville may face an increasingly bitter struggle of its own.

ONE of the most remarkable aspects of this remarkable organiza-

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Goldberg Protests the Surrender of Ellsberg Paper

By LINDA CHARLTON

Arthur J. Goldberg said yesterday that he was "shocked and surprised" by the decision of the Council on Foreign Relations, of which he is a member, to turn over to Federal authorities a paper delivered at a Council seminar last year by Dr. Daniel Ellsberg.

The council is essentially a large study group whose members, including prominent scholars, journalists and public officials, analyze international issues under strict rules of confidentiality. The Ellsberg paper, delivered at a November, 1970, seminar, was surrendered to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in response to a subpoena, about two weeks ago.

Mr. Goldberg asked "that a special meeting of the members of the council be convened to discuss this matter and to take appropriate action to repair the abridgement of free speech, association and expression which has occurred, to the extent that it is now possible to do so."

Mr. Goldberg, former United States Representative at the United Nations and former Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, made his comments in a letter to David Rockefeller, the council's chairman of the board, and its president, Bayliss Manning.

Ellsberg Is Disheartened

Dr. Ellsberg, in a telephone interview last night, said he had learned of the council's action "after they'd done it."

He was not so much angry, he said, as pained—"I was very disheartened at one more demonstration of a group of people who have forgotten to put to sleep their own sense of constitutional rights," he said. Dr. Ellsberg is a member of the council.

He said he felt there was a definite and valid distinction between official secrecy and individual privacy. As an example, he said: "I think that McGeorge Bundy's statements as an official, the public very much has the right to know. I would, on the other hand, not challenge his right to speak privately to the Council on Foreign Relations as a private citizen."

McGeorge Bundy was a special assistant to Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson for National Security offices.

Dr. Ellsberg said he was "very impressed" by Mr. Goldberg's letter. "It's

assuring to me to know that one of my colleagues on the council—and I'm sure there are others—sees this as a threat to his own Constitutional rights," he said.

"The council should have seen the threat to its very raison d'être since it exists to promote fruitful private communication with an objective to communicate with the public, enlightening the public, but with some preliminary confidentiality as promoting [these] ultimate interests."

Dr. Ellsberg, the former Pentagon employee who has said that he gave the secret Pentagon study of the Vietnam war to the press, delivered the seminar paper in November, 1970. According to John T. Swing, the council's associate executive director, the Council responded to the subpoena on the basis of legal opinions that there were no grounds for successfully resisting it.

Another participant in the seminar was William P. Bundy, former Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. Mr. Bundy, who will become editor next year of the Council's quarterly, Foreign Affairs,

said in a telephone interview yesterday that he had not been present at the seminar session at which Dr. Ellsberg presented his paper.

Mr. Bundy said, however, that he had read Dr. Ellsberg's paper and that it "had nothing to do with the Pentagon papers that I could detect." He said that he felt the council had "no reasonable basis" to resist the subpoena.

Goldberg Disagrees

Mr. Goldberg, however, said in his letter, which he also released to the press, that he disagreed with this legal judgment "and would have so indicated had I been asked my views as a member of the council."

"In any event," he added, "I should have thought that, at the very minimum, the subpoena should have been resisted and Dr. Ellsberg's paper turned over to the Government only after a decision by a court of last resort."

He also said, "I firmly believe that the members of the council should have been consulted and their views ascertained before action was taken.

Speaking for myself, I have not delegated to the officers of the council my Constitutional rights. And I feel that my Constitutional rights have been eroded by this ill-conceived action."

"In light of what has occurred," he said, "I do not see how the council can effectively in the future conduct 'of the record sessions' where speakers 'can freely express their views to council members under rules of confidentiality.'"

Mr. Swing, asked to comment on Mr. Goldberg's letter, said "There is a council policy on confidentiality." But he added that he would not comment "on a letter I have not seen." Mr. Manning could not be reached.

Dr. Ellsberg is under indictment in Los Angeles for the alleged possession and conversion to private use of Government documents. A grand jury in Boston has been investigating how the Pentagon study was disseminated. The subpoena for the council paper was signed by a Federal Court clerk in Boston.

Org 1 Council on Foreign Relations

Ellsberg, Daniel

CIA-03 Bundy, William

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Foreign Relations Group Yields Ellsberg Seminar Paper to F.B.I.

By NICHOLAS GAGE

The Council on Foreign Relations, a study group of prominent Americans who analyze international issues under strict rules of confidentiality, has responded to a subpoena by turning over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation a seminar paper delivered last year by Dr. Daniel Ellsberg.

John T. Swing, associate executive director, said the council surrendered the paper two weeks ago "when advised by our counsel that there were no grounds under which the subpoena could be successfully resisted."

Dr. Ellsberg, once a Pentagon employe and now a research associate at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has said that he gave the Pentagon papers on the Vietnam war to the press.

The subject of the seminar contribution was "Escalation as a Military Strategy in Limited War." It was delivered last November—seven months before publication of the Pentagon papers by The New York Times and other newspapers—in a study group that included William P. Bundy, former Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, and Helmut Sonnenfeldt, who is on the staff of the National Security Council.

Under the aegis of the council, which has its headquarters at Pratt House, 53 West 68th Street, discussion groups, scholarly papers and studies laid the foundation for the Marshall Plan for European recovery and set policy guidelines for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Humphrey and Westmoreland

Its list of 1,500 active members includes more prominent names than any similar group. Among them are Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, Gen. William C. Westmoreland, former Supreme Court Justice Arthur J. Goldberg, David Rockefeller, and Kingman Brewster Jr., president of Yale.

Since its founding 50 years ago the council has emphasized

privacy to give members an opportunity to speak freely. An indiscretion by a member can be grounds for "termination or suspension."

As a result the council is host weekly to heads of state, diplomats, high United States officials, political leaders and experts in all fields. Almost all the meetings are off the record.

Discussing the subpoena, Mr. Swing said it was signed by the clerk of the Federal District Court in Boston. A Federal grand jury there has been conducting an investigation since last August on how the secret Pentagon study reached the press.

Mr. Swing said the F.B.I. agents asked the council for a copy of the paper a month ago. "We did not turn it over to them then because we have a council rule on confidentiality which extends to the Government and which we take very seriously," he said.

On the Advice of Counsel

The agents came back with a subpoena two weeks later, he said, "and the decision was made to comply following the advice of our counsel."

He would not say who had participated in the decision. David Rockefeller is chairman of the council's board of directors and Bayless Manning is its president. Mr. Rockefeller, chairman of the Chase Manhattan Bank, is on a trip to Africa and Mr. Manning could not be reached for comment.

After the decision was made and the paper was turned over to the F.B.I., Mr. Swing said, a letter was sent to Dr. Ellsberg telling him what had happened.

Asked why Dr. Ellsberg was not told about it earlier, Mr. Swing said that "it had something to do with legal reasons, I believe."

The council is represented by the law firm of Debevoise, Plimpton, Lyons & Gates. Oscar Ruebhausen, the member in charge of council matters, said it would be inappropriate to discuss the advice he gave his client.

Friends of Dr. Ellsberg, who is a nonresident member of the council, said that he was angry that he was not told anything until after his paper had been turned over to the F.B.I. He

Most Unaware of Step

A sampling of council members yesterday showed that most were not aware of the action on the Ellsberg paper and most declined to comment until they could learn more about it.

Dr. Stanley Hoffman of Harvard, a nonresident member who said he learned about the action "a few days ago," said he was upset.

"What's upsetting is that the council did not see fit to inform its members and did not even make a fuss about turning over the papers," he explained. "I find it appalling that one can't even give a paper before a study group without having it subpoenaed."

George W. Ball, former Under Secretary of State, did not take issue with the council's action. "Any organization of this kind must have trust and confidence in its directors and executive staff," he said. "If they make a decision, we ought to abide by it."

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BOSTON, MASS.
GLOBE

OCT 3 1971
M - 237,967
S - 566,377

British ousted 105 Russians purely because of numbers

World powers all play 'legal spy' game; it's a way of life

By Nathan Cobb
Globe Staff

While official US sources have remained tight-lipped regarding last week's expulsion by Britain of 105 Soviet diplomats and other officials for spying, this area's best-known academic authorities on government intelligence have reacted with surprise.

Their response is based on their belief the Soviets probably have more official agents in Britain than the 105 who were revealed, even though the figure represents nearly one-fifth of the diplomatic and commercial representatives in the country.

In addition, they stated this week that such a percentage of "legal spies" placed on foreign soil — agents with official functions who are covered by diplomatic immunities and treaties — is typical of most major world powers, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union.

According to Dr. William R. Harris, currently a teaching fellow at Harvard, the "low percentage" of names revealed suggests that the British have not identified the remaining agents or simply want to keep them under surveillance for purposes of counter-intelligence.

Dr. Harris has just completed a mammoth bibliography on intelligence and national security, and was part of a 1968 Council on Foreign Relations discussion group on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) which included several former US intelligence officials.

At Tufts University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Prof. Barton Whaley stated that it is

uncommon for 20 to 25 percent of a US, Soviet or any other world-power embassy staff to be trained intelligence agents. Prof. Whaley has studied government intelligence for 11 years and has compiled works of US military and Soviet intelligence.

The entire business of "legal spying" goes back centuries. "Legal agents" operating under "official cover" have been bounced from Napoleonic France, Czarist Russia and World War II Britain. Since 1960, 22 Russians have been asked to leave the US, the last in February, 1970. A US State Department spokesman would not reveal the number of Americans on "official business" who have been expelled from the USSR for allegedly spying, saying only that "the number is about the same."

While it has generally been conceded that the Russians put a heavier emphasis on espionage than other powers (FBI Dir. J. Edgar Hoover has said that 80 percent of the Russians stationed in the US are spies), both Dr. Harris and Prof. Whaley expressed skepticism that a higher percentage of Russians in a given embassy are more likely to be involved in spying than their counterparts at an American embassy.

They added, however, that the Russians usually have larger staffs. For example, the Soviet embassy in Washington has 202 Russian employees, while the US embassy in Moscow employs 109 Americans. The British have 78 officials at their Moscow embassy, while there are 550 Soviet officials in London.

Much of the Soviet intelligence-gathering is overseen by the Committee for State Security (KGB). According to one local Soviet expert, KGB members within an embassy often hold more power than the am-

rectly to KGB headquarters at 2 Dzerzhinski st., Moscow.

The US intelligence effort comes under the United States Intelligence Board, and its members consist of representatives of such agencies as the CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, Dept. of State, FBI and Atomic Energy Commission. The CIA has primary jurisdiction and its director, Richard Helms, is chairman of the Intelligence Board.

At the Council of Foreign Relations meeting attended by Dr. Harris in 1968, it was revealed that the CIA would prefer to transfer its major foreign espionage efforts from embassies to "unofficial cover" sources such as businessmen, members of private organizations or foreign recruits. There have been no indications that such a shift has taken place.

What does a "legal spy" do?

According to the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the 105 agents evicted from his country were busying themselves with the "running of agents, instruction in the use of clandestine techniques, and the offer and payment of considerable sums of money to residents to acquire classified information."

"Generally," added Prof. Whaley of Tufts, "the 'legal agent' directs, recruits and collects information from whatever source he can. That includes everything from circulating at an embassy party to recruiting citizens of the country in which he's stationed. He usually doesn't do much spying himself; he recruits people to do it."

"And often," Dr. Harris added, "the mission in one country will be directed towards a third country. They find they get less flak from the host country if that country knows their efforts are directed against another country."

in diplomatic circles, a tacit agreement among nations. Only occasionally are controls such as last week's imposed

E - 326,376
S - 541,868

SEP 26 1971

Confidential Report Urges More Secrecy In CIA Spying

By RICHARD DUDMAN
Chief Washington
Correspondent of the
Post-Dispatch

WASHINGTON, Sept. 25.—A confidential report being circulated in Washington and Boston urges that the Central Intelligence Agency improve its secrecy in penetrating private institutions at home and abroad.

The document proposes also that the CIA direct its covert operations particularly at Africa, Asia and Latin America and make wide use of agents other than Americans.

The report is a summary of a panel discussion on intelligence and foreign policy conducted by the Council on Foreign Relations in New York Jan. 8, 1968.

Copies of the document are being circulated in this country and Europe by a group of radical scholars in Cambridge, Mass., as "a still-relevant primer on the theory and practice of the Central Intelligence Agency" and "a fair warning as to the direction of the agency's interests and efforts."

Leader of the 1968 discussion was Richard M. Bissell Jr., a former CIA deputy director who was in charge of the U-2 spy plane program in the late 1950s and the abortive invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in 1961. He left the Government in 1962 and is a vice president at United Aircraft Corp.

Others in the group were the late Allen W. Dulles, who had been the CIA director; Robert Amory Jr., who had been the deputy CIA director for intelligence; Thomas L. Hughes, then director of intelligence and research at the Department of State and now president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Meyer Bernstein, director of international affairs for the United Steel Workers of America.

Former Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon was chairman. The document, reporting Bissell's review and appraisal of the CIA's covert operations, said: "If the agency is to be effective, it will have to make use of private institutions on an expanding scale, though those relations which have 'blown' cannot be resurrected.

"We need to operate under deeper cover, with increased attention to the use of 'cut-outs,' CIA's interface with the rest of the world needs to be better protected."

Bissell's presentation, as reported in the summary, referred frequently to exposes in the previous year of the CIA's penetration and financing of the National Student Association and other private organizations, including trade union organizations overseas.

"If various groups hadn't been aware of the source of their funding, the damage subsequent to disclosure might have been far less than occurred," the summary said.

"The CIA interface with various private groups, including business and student groups, must be remedied."

Other documents, obtained in early 1959 by the Post-Dispatch, showed that the U.S. Agency for International Development had picked up the tab for certain overseas programs that had been financed secretly by the CIA. These became known as "CIA orphans" after the secret financing was disclosed.

The change apparently grew out of a 1957 order by President Lyndon B. Johnson prohibiting any further hidden subsidies to private voluntary organizations. He promised to consider a proposal that the Federal Government establish "a public-private mechanism to provide public funds openly for overseas activities of organizations which are adjudged deserving, in the national interest, of public support."

As a result, AID funds have been used to finance in part certain international labor programs handled through the AFL-CIO.

One member of the 1968 panel, not identified but apparently Bernstein, the Steelworkers' officer, was quoted as saying that it was common knowledge even before the exposes of 1967 that there had labor programs.

Persons in international labor affairs were dismayed, he said, over public disclosure of this CIA support. He said that "certain newspapers compounded their difficulties by confusing AID with CIA."

The summary continued, quoting the same speaker: "Since these disclosures, the turn of events has been unexpected. First, there hasn't been any real trouble with international labor programs. Indeed, there has been an increase in demand for U.S. labor programs and the strain on our capacity has been embarrassing. Formerly these common labor unions knew we were short of funds, but now they all assume we have secret CIA money, and they ask for more help."

Citing labor union in British Guiana as an example, he said they were "supported through CIA conduits, but now they ask for more assistance than before."

In the summary of Bissell's presentation, the report said the United States should make increasing use persons other than American citizens who "should be encouraged to develop a second loyalty, more or less comparable to that of the American staff."

"The desirability of more effective use of foreign nationals increases as we shift our attention to Latin America, Asia and Africa, where the conduct of United States nationals is easily subject to scrutiny and circumscribed," the summary

said. Bissell was reported to have suggested that the CIA could use foreign nationals increasingly as "career agents," with a status midway between classical agent in a single operation and that of a staff member involved through his career in many operations.

At another point, the account of Bissell's presentation asked the question "From whom is a covert operation to be kept secret?"

"After five days, for example, the U-2 flights were not secret from the Russians, but these operations remained highly secret in the United States and with good reason," the summary said.

"If these overflights had 'leaked' to the American press, the USSR would have been forced to take action."

"On a less severe level, the same problem applies to satellite reconnaissance. These are examples of two hostile governments collaborating to keep operations secret from the general public of both sides. Unfortunately, there aren't enough of these situations."

Returning to covert financing of private organizations overseas, Bissell said that such pro-

continued

Seeks Shift to 'Unofficial Cover'

CIA Fears a Mass Exposure

25X1

By Chicago Sun-Times

WASHINGTON — The Central Intelligence Agency has long feared the type of mass exposure that befell Soviet intelligence in Britain last week, a confidential report disclosed Monday.

The report shows that the CIA has been trying for several years to shift its espionage operations away from U. S. embassies and offices to "unofficial cover" — private organizations and

businesses and "non-U. S. nationals."

It acknowledges that tough Russian security has forced the CIA to collect intelligence on the Soviet Union through "third-country" operations — just as the Russians apparently were seeking intelligence on the United States through its spy apparatus in Britain.

THE REPORT, a copy of which has been obtained by The Chicago

Sun-Times, is based on a discussion among several former high-ranking intelligence officials conducted by the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on Jan. 8, 1968.

Richard M. Bissell, former deputy director of the CIA and moderator of the discussion, has confirmed the authenticity of the report, which is headed: "Confidential: Not for publication. Restricted to group members only. Not to be quoted or cited."

THE PARTICIPANTS included Allen Dulles, the late director of the CIA; Robert Amory Jr., a former deputy director of the CIA; Eugene Fubini, former assistant secretary of defense in the area of electronic intelligence; Thomas L. Hughes, former director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and Theodore Sorenson, special assistant to President Kennedy.

Although the report does not identify the source of various opinions and comments, Bissell appears to have been the main contributor.

"If the agency is to be effective," the report declares at one point, "it will have to make use of private institutions on an expanding scale. . . . CIA's interface with the rest of the world needs to be better protected."

THE REPORT calls for "deeper cover" and "increased attention to the use of 'cut-outs'" defined in a footnote as "projects backed by the CIA which cannot be traced back to the CIA."

The report concedes that there are "powerful reasons" for concealing CIA agents within U. S. embassies, principally to provide safe means of communication to Washington.

"Nonetheless," it goes on, "it is possible and desirable, although difficult and time-consuming, to build overseas an apparatus of unofficial cover. This would require the use or creation of private organizations, many of the personnel of which would be non-U. S. nationals, with freer entry into the local society and less implication for the official U. S. posture."

THE REPORT suggested links with U. S. corporations which could make their own lines of communication available to CIA agents.

All 105 of the Russian officials expelled by Britain last Friday were under "official cover," operating out of the Soviet embassy or trade mission. As such they were much more susceptible to British counterintelligence than "unofficial cover" agents such as those suggested in the Bissell

e. a. Dulles, Allen

✓ - Amory, Robert

RECORD OF '68 DISCUSSION

The CIA Has 'Cover' Problems, Too

By JAMES DOYLE

Star Staff Writer

Early in 1968 a group including former officials of the Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department settled down after dinner at the Harold Pratt House, on New York's Avenue, to discuss some of the CIA's problems.

A record of their conversation shows that the particular concern of the group that night was how to provide a deeper cover for Americans gathering information by using non-governmental organizations as fronts.

The participants were members and guests of the prestigious Council on Foreign Relations, men who seem to direct foreign policy from within and without the government on a permanent basis, and publishers of "Foreign Affairs," the quarterly bible of American diplomacy.

A record of the discussion at the council's headquarters on that evening, Jan. 8, 1968, has been circulated to some newspapers by a group of self-styled radical scholars based in Cambridge.

It portrays with some new details the structure and the style of the American intelligence community. The document is timely in the wake of events last week in London, where 105 members of the Soviet community there, including employees from the Soviet embassy, trade delegation, tourist agency, Moscow Narodny Bank and Aeroflot Airline were uncovered as espionage agents, and banned from the country without replacements.

It was a fear of just such an incident, apparently, that dominated the conversation at Pratt House that night.

The U.S. "employees" whose cover constantly is endangered, the participants felt, are those who work in the American Embassies, trade delegations, and other U.S. agencies in countries around the world.

Richard Bissell, a former deputy director of the CIA who left the agency after the Bay of Pigs debacle, led the discussion. According to the record made available to The Star, he told his council colleagues that

agents "need to operate under deeper cover."

Bissell recounted ruefully the uproar over the CIA's exposed funding of the National Student Association's overseas activities and said, "The CIA interface with various private groups, including business and student groups, must be remedied."

He noted that the problems of American spies overseas "is frequently a problem of the State Department."

"It tends to be true that local allies find themselves dealing always with an American and an official American—since the cover is almost invariably as a U.S. government employee," Bissell is reported to have said.

"There are powerful reasons for this practice, and it will always be desirable to have some CIA personnel housed in the embassy compound, if only for local 'command post' and communications requirements.

"Nonetheless, it is possible and desirable, although difficult and time-consuming, to build overseas an apparatus of unofficial cover," Bissell is quoted as saying.

"This would require the use or creation of private organizations, many of the personnel of which would be non-U.S. nationals, with freer entry into the local society and less implication for the official U.S. posture."

Use Non-Americans

Bissell said that the United States needed to increase its use of non-Americans for espionage "with an effort at indoctrination and training: they should be encouraged to develop a second loyalty, more or less comparable to that of the American staff."

He added that as intelligence efforts shifted more toward Latin America, Asia and Africa, "the conduct of U.S. nationals is likely to be increasingly circumscribed. The primary change recommended would be to build up a system of unofficial cover. . . . The CIA might be able to make use of non-nationals as 'carcer agents', that is with a status midway between that for the classical agent used in a

and that of a staff member involved through his career in many operations, and well informed of the agency's capabilities."

An unidentified former State Department official responded to Bissell that he agreed with the need to change covers, noting that "the initial agreement between the agency and State was intended to be 'temporary', but nothing endures like the ephemeral."

Another participant noted that very little attention was paid to revelations of the CIA's use of supposedly independent operations such as "Radio Free Europe," he added, "One might conclude that the public is not likely to be concerned by the penetration of overseas institutions, at least not nearly so much as by the penetration of U.S. institutions."

This participant was quoted as saying, "The public doesn't think it's right; they don't know where it ends; they take a look at their neighbors." Then he asked whether "this suggested expansion in use of private institutions should include those in the United States, or U.S. institutions operating overseas?"

In response, clear distinctions were reportedly made between operating in the United States and abroad, and the suggestion was made by Bissell, "One might want CIA to expand its use of private U.S. corporations, but for objectives outside the United States."

Fund Demands Rise

The record of the discussion did not link comment and author, but did give a general identification of the men present. There also was a diligent removal from the authorized reporter's transcript of all specific references of agents, incidents and the like, with one noticeable lapse.

In a discussion of the effect of revelations that the CIA was financing U.S. labor union activities abroad, it was noted that these disclosures had simply increased the demand for such funds from overseas labor groups.

British Guiana labor unions

"were supported through CIA conduits, but now they ask for more assistance than before. So, our expectations to the contrary, there has been no damage."

Those present and taking part in the discussion included men who have journeyed back and forth between government and corporate work, most of whom have remained near the center of the foreign policy establishment.

They included Bissell, now an executive with United Aircraft Corp. in Hartford, Conn.; former Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon; former CIA director Allen Dulles; Robert Amory Jr., a former deputy director of the CIA; Meyer Bernstein, director of international affairs for the United Steelworkers of America; columnist Joseph Kraft; former White House aide Theodore Sorensen of Kennedy and Johnson days; and Philip Quigg, recently resigned as managing editor of Foreign Affairs.

Facsimile copies of the discussion summary have been circulated by "The Africa Research Group," a dozen young scholars in Cambridge who take a radical dissenting view of U.S. foreign policy.

Reached at his home, Bissell confirmed the authenticity of the document.

He noted that in the discussion that night in New York, he had begun by saying that agent espionage was the least valuable of three main CIA missions, behind reconnaissance and electronic intelligence, the two areas where most CIA money is spent.

sec. 4.01.1 Foreign Affairs
CIA 1.02 Bissell, Richard
N - Amory, Robert

CIA 2.04.2 Students
CIA 4.01 Radio Free Europe
P - Kraft, Joseph
CIA 1.01 Dulles, Allen
CIA 1.01 Bay of Pigs

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A CIA Paper

"...Although this entire series of discussions was 'off the record', the subject of discussion for this particular meeting was especially sensitive and subject to the previously announced restrictions."

—C. Douglas Dillon

By The Africa Research Group

The Central Intelligence Agency is one of the few governmental agencies whose public image has actually improved as a result of the publication of the Pentagon Papers. Despite disclosures of "The Agency's" role in assassinations, sabotage, and coup d'etats consciously intended to subvert international law, America's secret agency has actually emerged in some quarters with the veneration due prophets, or at least the respect due its suggested efficiency and accuracy.

Virtually every newspaper editor, not to mention Daniel Ellsberg himself, has heaped praise on the CIA for the accuracy of its estimates detailing the U.S. defeat in Vietnam. Time and again, the Agency's "level headed professionalism" has been contrasted with the escalation-overkill orientation of the Pentagon or the President's advisors. The editor of the Christian Science Monitor even called upon policy makers to consult the CIA more, calling it a "remarkably accurate source of information." But such backhanded praise for conspirators confuses public understanding of the important and closely integrated role which the CIA plays in advancing the Pax Americana on a global scale.

For many, the Pentagon Papers provided a first peek into the inner sanctum of foreign policy making. As the government's attempt to suppress the study illustrates, the people are not supposed to have access to the real plans of their government. On close inspection, what emerges is not an "invisible government" but an indivisible system in which each agency offers its own specialized input, and is delegated its own slice of responsibility. Coordinated inter-departmental agencies work out the division of imperial labor. There are disagreements and bureaucratic

rivalries, to be sure, but once the decisions are reached at the top they are carried out with the monolithic tone of state power.

The intelligence community now plays an expanded and critical role in creating and administering the real stuff of American foreign policy. CIA Director Richard Helms presides over a U.S. Intelligence Board which links the secret services of all government agencies, including the FBI. In the White House, Henry Kissinger presides over an expanded National Security Council structure which further centralizes covert foreign policy planning. It is here that the contingency plans are cooked up and the "options" so carefully worked out. It is in these closed chambers and strangelovian "situation rooms" that plans affecting the lives of millions are formulated for subsequent execution by a myriad of U.S. controlled agencies and agents.

Increasingly, these schemes rely on covert tactics whose full meaning is seldom perceived by the people affected -- be they Americans or people of foreign countries. The old empires, with their colonial administrators and civilizing mission have given way to the more subtle craftsman of intervention. Their manipulations take place in the front rooms of neo-colonial institutions and the parlors of dependent third world elites. In this world of realpolitik, appearances are often purposely deceptive and political stances intentionally misleading. The U.S. aggression in Vietnam, lest anyone forget, began as a covert involvement largely engineered by the CIA. Similar covert interventions now underway elsewhere in the world may be fueling tomorrow's Vietnams.

It is for this reason that the Africa Research Group, an independent radical research collective, is now making public major excerpts from a document which offers an informed insider's view of the secret workings of the American intelligence apparatus abroad. Never intended for publication, it was made available to the Group which will publish the entire text in October, 1971.*

CIA manipulations.

Richard Bissell, the man who led the Council discussion that night, was well equipped to talk about the CIA. A one-time Yale professor and currently an executive of the United Aircraft Corporation, Bissell served as the CIA's Deputy Director until he "resigned" in the wake of the abortive 1961 invasion of Cuba. The blue-ribbon group to which he spoke included a number of intelligence experts including Robert Amory, Jr., another former Deputy Director, and the late CIA chief, Allen Dulles, long considered the grand old man of American espionage. Their presence was important enough an occasion for international banker Douglas Dillon to

*The complete text of the document will be available for \$1 in late October from Africa Research Group, P.O. Box 213, 2138.

After 1967 expose CIA sought new ties with campus, labor

By Crocker Snow Jr.
 Globe Staff

The written report of a confidential discussion about Central Intelligence Agency operations held in 1968, a year after the public controversy over agency involvement with the National Student Assn., shows the CIA was anxious to establish new contacts with other student groups, foundations, universities, labor organizations and corporations for its overseas work.

The discussion was held in January 1968 among ranking government officials and former officials, including several former CIA officers, under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York.

Though no direct quotes are attributed in the report, the opinion was stated by the discussion leader, Richard M. Bissell Jr., formerly a deputy director of the CIA, that: "If the agency is to be effective, it will have to make use of private institutions on an expanding scale, though these relations which have 'blown' cannot be resurrected."

The discussion also referred to the continued utility of labor groups and American corporations to CIA operations. No such groups or corporations are named.

The written report, like others sponsored by the council, is considered by the participants as "confidential" and "completely off the record."

The document is being circulated by the Africa Research Group, a small, radically oriented organization headquartered in Cambridge, because "it offers a still-relevant primer on the theory and practice of CIA manipulations."

Portions of the document are scheduled to appear today in the "University Review," a New York-based monthly.

The document reflects individual assessments of the CIA by those present. The report includes a number of general statements:

—The two elements of CIA activity, "intelligence collection" and "covert action" (or "intervention") are not separated within the agency but are considered to "overlap and interact."

—The focus of classical espionage in Europe and other developed parts of the world had shifted "toward targets in the underdeveloped world."

—Due to the clear jurisdictional boundary between the CIA and FBI, the intelligence agency was "adverse to surveillance of US citizens overseas (even when specifically requested) and adverse to operating against targets in the United States, except for foreigners here as transients."

—The acquisition of a secret speech by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in February 1956 was a classic example of the political use of secretly acquired intelligence. The State Department released the text which, according to one participant, prompted "the beginning of the split in the Communist movement." Since this speech had been specifically targeted before acquired, the results meant to this participant that "if you get a precise target and go after it, you can change history."

—"Penetration," by establishing personal relationships with individuals rather than simply hiring them, was regarded as especially useful in the underdeveloped world. The statement is made that "covert intervention (in the underdeveloped world) is usually designed to operate on the internal power balance, often with a fairly short-term objective."

—The reconnaissance of Russia and East Europe

during the '50s provided "limited but dramatic results." Flights were late of the cancelled scheduled summit between President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev after Francis G. Gary Powers was shot down in Laos.

"After five days flights were from the Russian side these operations highly secret in the United States, and will soon," reads the report. "These overflights 'leaked' to the press, the US has been forced to take action."

The meeting, was not to consider CIA missions so characteristic of the agency and proceed with discussion was led by a council staff member. "Intelligence as Policy."

The chairman of the meeting was William F. Dillon, an investment banker who had served in Washington as undersecretary of State and Secretary of the Treasury in the Kennedy Administration.

Twenty persons were listed as attending including prominent former officials and educators like Harry Howe Ransom of Vanderbilt University and David B. Truman, president of Mt. Holyoke College.

The list included Allen W. Dulles, former director of the CIA, and Robert Amory Jr., who had been deputy director, as well as Richard M. Bissell, who had been deputy director until shortly after the Bay of Pigs invasion, in which the CIA was involved.

The discussion took place just a year after revelations by Ramparts Magazine concerning CIA-funded training of agents for South Vietnam at

The document includes the statement that "it is notably true of the subsidies to student, labor and cultural groups that have recently been publicized that the agency's objective was never to control their activities, only occasionally to point them in a particular direction, but primarily to enlarge them and render them more effective."

In an article in the Saturday Evening Post in May 1967, Thomas Braden, who had helped set up the subsidies with Dulles, defended the concept as a way to combat the seven major front organizations of the Communist world in which the Russians through the use of their international fronts had stolen the great words such as peace, justice and freedom."

The report shows that the publicity had not been as damaging to CIA activities

RAMPAIS
OCTOBER 1971

The Making of America's China Policy

by David Horowitz

IT WAS A FRUSTRATING DAY for James Reston, vice-president of the *New York Times* and minister without portfolio for America's journalistic mandarinat. Landing in Peking on July 12 with the thought of, perhaps claiming new diplomatic territory as well as scoring a journalistic coup; he was told by the head of the information service of China's foreign ministry that Henry Kissinger had just left Peking and, it would shortly be announced, President Nixon would visit the People's Republic of China next spring. It was at this moment ("or so it now seems," Reston later wrote) that he experienced the first stab of pain in his side that would land him in the hospital for an emergency appendectomy the next day.

Before leaving New York, Reston had received a letter from Dr. Oliver McCoy, president of the China Medical Board, an institution John D. Rockefeller had created to run the medical college he had built there in 1916 and which was nationalized by the Communist government thirty-five years later. Dr. McCoy told Reston that if he should happen to notice a "large group of buildings with green tiled roofs not far from the southeast corner to inquire what those were." The old medical college had now become the Anti-Imperialist hospital, and it was in this unlikely setting that Reston had the consolation of at least being the first member of the American establishment to receive acupuncture treatments in the new China.

If such ironies dogged Reston's trip, they were also present in the larger drama that had been played out two days earlier amidst sumptuous 17-course dinners. For Henry Kissinger—the man who masterminded Nixon's new diplomacy in China and scooped James Reston—had once been the foreign policy advisor of the President's arch-rival for control of the Republican Party, Nelson Rockefeller. He was a strange *alter ego* to bear the tidings of American "friendship" which was being offered after twenty years of unrelenting official hostility by President Richard Nixon. And Richard Nixon was himself an unlikely president to be

making the offer. For this was the man who, in the words of Reston's *Times*, had "led the political clamor of the China lobby to ostracize the Chinese Communists from the community of 'peace-loving' nations" two decades ago and had earned spurs in the McCarthy purges by baiting the China experts who were then urging no greater accommodation to the revolutionary government than that for which Kissinger's secret mission had now set the stage.

These unexpected juxtapositions and ironic turns at the surface of policy are no mere coincidences. By their very incongruity, they suggest the presence of deeper continuities underlying Nixon's new approach toward the mainland. For despite sharp tactical lurches and even unforeseen veerings off course, there are few areas where the significant patterns of policy and personnel have been more stable in their way than in the field of China affairs. Nixon's new gesture, which looks almost impulsive and shrewdly tied to such political events as the 1972 election, has in fact been a bipartisan strategic planning assumption for a long time now among those who have always determined America's posture toward China. The *Times* itself pinpoints 1966 as the moment when Nixon realized that "no future American policy in Asia could succeed unless it came 'urgently to grips with the reality of China.'" All that was left to the White House quarterback was to choose the right political moment: "And just as his popularity at home dipped to a new low, with the Vietnam controversy swirling anew all around him and the North Vietnamese pressing for a quick and final deal to drive him out of Saigon before the end of 1971, Mr. Nixon lobbied the long one."

[CHINA AND THE AMERICAN EMPIRE]

SINCE THE CLOSING OF THE CONTINENTAL frontier at the end of the 19th century, China has occupied a special place in the self-conception of an American world role. Many historians have even designated America's subsequent global expansion as the pursuit

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without making a "fad" of the subject or destroying our system of manufacturing and business which is envied by every country on earth. By insisting that our education give at least equal time to the positive aspects of our country, instead of overlooking much of it because "patriotism is bunk." I think that every generation of young people has to be told about our country, educated in its meaning. Today we seem to think that we'll just "pick it up" naturally. This isn't always so.

We can make our country better by feeling—and showing—our pride in it. We have to think and act in a positive way instead of a negative one. This is a job where leadership has to come from the attitudes of our politicians, our teachers, our religions, but in which each one of us has an important role to play too.

We have an awful lot to be thankful for and proud of. If we work to make things better, they will become better. They will never be accomplished by people who sit on the sidelines and offer nothing but criticism. If we don't bother to do what we are capable of as individuals, and let people who think only in terms of tearing down have their way, and let them dominate public media, their gloomy predictions will come true.

You don't have to use propaganda to glorify a country which has always been a goal for a lot of little people all over the world. We do have to take stock of what we have, though, and to tell others—especially our own children—about it, so that they will understand and appreciate it and work themselves to make it better.

But in the end, it is not just words and ideas that are going to make it that way. It is the private actions of each one of us, because we're not just a people, or a nationality; we're 200,000,000 Americans—each one an individual, and each one free to add to or detract from this country of ours.

CBS, CFR AND THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW

HON. JOHN R. RARICK

OF LOUISIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, July 12, 1971

Mr. RARICK. Mr. Speaker, we will be voting shortly on a resolution to find CBS in contempt of Congress.

The CBS propagandists are wrapping themselves in the Constitution and chanting: "The right of the people to know must not be jeopardized."

Every Member of this body agrees that it is the right of the people to know what is at issue. But, has the CBS conglomerate been telling the people the facts or simply what CBS wants them to know? It has been CBS that has been the censor—not this body. The CBS "Selling of the Pentagon" was in turn followed by a second lateral assault called the Pentagon papers incident. Both Pentagon attacks must be considered as concerted efforts by the influential opinion molding monopoly to degrade our military forces under the guise of hastening an early Vietnam surrender date.

But the CBS people, who would have us believe they want to tell the American people the truth of what is going on involving imaginary financial and control conspiracies, have not told the American people about a very real conspiracy—which is to transfer the defeat of our

foreign policy in Vietnam from the responsible parties and make the military forces, who have had no voice in the planning of the no-win policy nor little control over the operations, the scapegoat. Pressure from the top and bottom now becomes lateral pressure from both sides.

I hold a copy of the so-called Pentagon papers booklet, which has been printed for profit by the New York Times.

Commencing at page 630 are contained the biographies of key figures in the Vietnam study. Eight of the 14 named Americans involved in the secret history are members of a financial-economic-industrial group known as the Council on Foreign Relations. The Pentagon, except for having an image of being the command post of our military, is not even involved. Why then does not CBS, which wants the American people to know what is going on, tell them all about the Council on Foreign Relations and its role in the United Nations and the Vietnam war?

Why does not CBS tell the American people that Mr. Sulzberger, president and publisher of the New York Times, the late Mr. Graham, former chairman of the board of the Washington Post, as well as its board chairman Frederick S. Beebe are listed in the Council on Foreign Relations membership list?

Why do not CBS's interpretive analysts tell our people that their president, Frank Stanton, is listed as a member of the CFR as well as former chairman of the Rand Corp., or that Daniel Ellsberg, admitted thief of the stolen top secret Pentagon papers, is a member of CFR?

What is it about the CFR that the CBS refuses to tell the people?

Could it be that every U.S. Ambassador to the Paris peace talks, David K. E. Bruce, Henry Cabot Lodge, and Averell W. Harriman, are all listed as members of the CFR?

Could it be that the Presidential advisers Henry A. Kissinger, Walt W. Rostow, and McGeorge Bundy are listed as members of the CFR?

Could it be that the U.S. Ambassadors to Saigon, Frederick Reinhardt, Henry Cabot Lodge, Maxwell Taylor, and Ellsworth Bunker are all listed as members of the CFR?

Could it be that the Directors of the CIA, Allen Dulles, John J. McCloy, and John A. McCone are all listed as members of the CFR?

Or could it be that the military leaders who were entrusted with the lives of our men and with the honor of our country, Gen. William C. Westmoreland, Gen. Harold K. Johnson, Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Fleet Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, and Air Force Gen. Carl A. Spaatz are all listed as members of the CFR?

Could it be that Stanley Resor, Secretary of the Army; former Secretaries of State Dean Rusk and Dean Acheson; former Secretaries of Defense Thomas S. Gates and Robert Strange McNamara are listed as members of the CFR?

Could it be that CBS and many of its other opinion-making friends do not want to tell the American people that Mr. Arthur Ochs Sulzberger, president and publisher of the New York Times; Mr. Frederick S. Beebe, chairman of the board of the Washington Post; Mr. Os-

borne Elliott, president of Newsweek; Walter Lippmann, syndicated news columnist and editor of the New Republic magazine; Mr. Bill D. Moyers of Newsday; and Brig. Gen. David Sarnoff are all listed as members of the CFR?

Certainly CBS, in addition to knowing its president, Frank Stanton, is a member of the CFR, must fully understand the complete scope of this intellectual-financial-industrial complex, in fact, in December of 1965, the CBS Foundation made a \$300,000 grant to the CFR to fund a fellowship reportedly to "a promising American foreign correspondent" for "study and reflection."

And how do we know who are members of the CFR? From the CFR annual report, which is supplied voluntarily to each Member of Congress and each Senator. There are reportedly but 1,451 members. Yet this small group of Americans includes men in positions of control or influence in every military, financial, and diplomatic decision from the start of our involvement in Vietnam to the present.

I do not want to create any impression that there are any secret or mysterious associations. But when the policies and activities of the CFR are against the best interests of the American people and constitutional government, then they, like all other decisionmakers, must bear their share of the responsibility for the thousands of American boys who have been killed and the waste of billions of taxpayers' dollars that have been poured into this international economic venture.

It was not the average American citizen nor the U.S. fighting man who wanted this war in the first place or who have wanted it to continue. If CBS and Mr. Stanton want to lift their self-imposed censorship so that the American people know the truth, then this matter would not be before Congress in this instance.

"The Selling of the Pentagon" and the Pentagon papers have not scratched the surface of the kingmakers and new ruling royalty. Who will tell the people the truth if those who control "the right to know machinery" also control the Government?

I insert a clipping from the December 30, 1965, New York Times:

EDWARD R. MURROW FUND FOR FELLOWSHIPS
SET UP


John J. McCloy, chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations, announced yesterday the establishment of an Edward R. Murrow Fellowship for American Foreign Correspondents.

William S. Paley, chairman of the Columbia Broadcasting Company, joined Mr. McCloy in making the announcement. The C.B.S. Foundation has given \$300,000 to pay for the fellowship program.

A spokesman for C.B.S. said one fellowship would be awarded each year to "a promising American foreign correspondent" for "study and reflection." A committee composed largely of men connected with the council will make the selection. C.B.S. will also be represented on the committee. The stipend is expected to be about \$10,000 in most cases.

I particularly call the attention of my colleagues to my remarks "CFR: For Whom We Serve," page E11137, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of December 29, 1969,

21 APR 1977



BAYLESS MANNING
... new Council head

Foreign Relations

NEW YORK—Bayless Manning, dean of the Stanford University Law School, was named as full-time president of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Manning, who will take office in September, will replace both Grayson Kirk as president and George Franklin as executive director. Manning was a special assistant to former Under Secretary of State George Ball in 1962. He became Stanford dean in 1964.

**"If a government is going to lie,
it can probably do so for a short period, and
when that period is over it should generally
admit what it did and why. For it is continual
exaggeration and distortion rather than the indi-
vidual lie that are really damaging to a society."**

—WILLIAM J. BARNES

CIA 4-Vietnam S.
N. Cuba-Bay of Pigs
CIA 4.01 Special Forces
P-Blackstock, Paul W.
Org 1 Council on Foreign
Relations

Orig. under
Barnes

Per. Hoffa, Jimmy
Per. Patterson, Eleanor

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American

CAPSULE NEWS

We
Call A
Spade By Its
Right Name

The Uninhibited Compact All-American Newspaper

Our Cockeyed Foreign Policy

STANDARD OIL UBER ALLES

Our foreign policy is something that has puzzled realists since the happy daze of the Roosevelt administration. Except during the Truman era, when it was a total blank, it has been growing in venality and intensity. Frankly, its sole purpose is to protect the huge Rockefeller industrial interests abroad. The latest price we have paid for it is the deaths of over 3,800 American boys (to date) in our senseless no-win war in Viet Nam, the only honest account of which has been published in January CAPSULE NEWS.

Standard Oil is the sole beneficiary of the Viet Nam Crime. But other large branches of the Rockefeller Hierarchy abroad are being protected by the tax dollars of American victims. How they do it has been a-building since they and their Kept Press jimmied Franklin Roosevelt into the White House.

In 1919, a small group from the Wall Street international banking fraternity organized to get us involved in the abortive League of Nations. They called it the "Council on Foreign Relations." A small group of pro-American Senators combined to stop this, altho they were pilloried unmercifully by the Kept Press. In 1927, the House of Rockefeller took over the CFR lock, stock and barrel, provided all the cash needed to operate and even a large house at the corner of Park Avenue and 68th Street in NY City as headquarters.

Super Training School---This has become, among other things, a training school for Cabinet Officers and high echelon State Department officials, not to speak of ambassadors to foreign countries in which the Rockefeller industrial empire has large installations. Its latest annual report lists 1,424 "students", 722 of whom are stationed outside of New York and many of them in foreign embassies. Included in this non-resident list are the current Secretaries of State, Defense, Treasury and Commerce and the head of the (making it their) CIA and foreign-aid giveaways, called AID.

It is also significant that they "signed up" every Presidential candidate they could---winners and losers. Such as Dewey and Stevenson (2-time losers), Hoover (winner-loser), Eisenhower and Kennedy (winners). They didn't get Nixon (the real 1960 winner) so they stole the election from him.

Truman never was listed but he started the Korean War for them (illegally) when the Chinese Reds captured the Chase National Bank branch in Peking and helped themselves to 30 million Rockefeller dollars. LBJ's name is not on their list yet, but he is serving them faithfully by keeping the Viet Nam Crime going so Standard Oil operations on the Peninsula won't be interfered with.

Rockefeller Hierarchy Protectorate---To protect the political and business interests of more than a score of huge Rockefeller companies abroad, and many lesser ones, they have appointed the Secretary of State (Rusk), two Undersecretaries (Ball & Mann) and three Assistant Secretaries (Bundy, MacArthur and Talbott). (Turn Over)

NEXT: COCKEYED RACISM

MAY 15 1966

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS GET PRIVATE LOOK

Council of Eminent Figures
Influences U.S. Policy

By HENRY RAYMONT

The Council on Foreign Relations, which for nearly half a century has made substantial contributions to the basic concepts of American foreign policy, is considering opening its doors to younger members, especially scientists and labor leaders.

For years the society's accent was on attracting prominent bankers, industrialists and diplomats as well as eminent academic figures. Now the trend is beginning to move toward younger men who can bring a new perspective to the analysis of world trends.

As a first step, plans have been made to select young scientists familiar with the problems of space and its international implications and representatives of the labor movement. It is hoped that younger people — the average age of the council's 1,400 members now is 60 — will bring fresh perspective to problems.

The council is a private, non-partisan organization that is a testing ground for new ideas, with enough political and financial power to bring the ideas to the attention of the policy makers in Washington. It is also a recruiting agency for ranking officials.

Home of Ideas

The council has its headquarters at Pratt House, 58 East 68th Street. Intensive discussions of world events originate there at unpublicized luncheons and closed seminars and go on to have practical impact on United States policies.

Discussion groups, scholarly papers and studies sponsored by the council laid the groundwork for the Marshall Plan for European recovery and Ameri-

can policy guidelines for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and currently are evolving a long-range analysis of American attitudes toward China.

The society's best known publication is Foreign Affairs, a quarterly journal that has not changed its smoky-blue cover since 1922 and has consistently printed articles by leading statesmen, political scientists and economists.

The organization's concern with immediate events and its acknowledged impact in Washington has earned it such characterizations as "the government-in-exile" and "the best club in New York." John Kenneth Galbraith, the economist and former Ambassador to India, said the council was "as much a part of the ruling establishment" as the State Department.

The council's reputation as a power behind the throne was almost inevitable because of the prominent names of its members and the range of their influence. The board of directors, headed by John J. McCloy, includes David Rockefeller, president of the Chase Manhattan Bank; former Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon; Grayson Kirk, president of Columbia University; Thomas K. Finletter and R. Labrousse, diplomat and executive director of the United Nations Children's Fund.

There is also little doubt that the council's membership of business executives, corporation lawyers, government officials, bankers and university professors is one of the most impressive of its kind. It includes former President Eisenhower, Vice President Humphrey and Secretary of State Dean Rusk.

Since its founding 45 years ago, the council has emphasized privacy to give members an opportunity to speak freely. Except for its annual public Elihu Root Lectures, the council's talks and seminars are strictly off the record. An indiscretion can be ground for "termination or suspension" of membership, according to Article II of the council's by-laws.

3 VOLUMES ON CHINA WILL APPEAR TODAY

The Council on Foreign Relations is trying to promote a new discussion on China in high levels of Government with the publication of a series of books dealing with the United States and China in world affairs. The first three volumes are to be published today by McGraw-Hill Book Company.

Allen W. Dulles, a director of the council, discussed the studies, which will fill at least 11 volumes, at a recent luncheon at the Harold Pratt House, home of the group. He said it was hoped that they would cause Government officials and experts "to see what can be done, in the interest of world peace."

He added that the council did not have official views on any international question. "It facilitates the work of those who can say something of importance," he said.

The first three books are "The American People and China," by A. T. Steele; "Policies Toward China: Views from Six Continents," edited by A. M. Halpern, and "Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade," by Alexander Eckstein.

JACKSON, MISS.

CLARION-LEDGER

M. 58,910

S. 96.653

JAN 14 1966

Dear Editor:

McGeorge Bundy has resigned his post as Special Assistant to the President (under both JFK and LBJ). At first consideration this seems to be hopeful news, since wherever Bundy has appeared on the scene, he has engineered defeat for the U. S. viz: Vietnam, Dominican Republic, etc.

And on December 30, 1965 Bundy flew to Canada to confer with Socialist - Internationalist Canadian Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson on the question of peace negotiations in Vietnam. This one item alone heralds the sell - out and defeat America will experience at the "peace" table.

McGeorge Bundy is a non-resident (more than fifty miles from New York City Hall) of the Council on Foreign Relations. "The ultimate aim of the Council on Foreign Relations (however well-intentioned its prominent and powerful members may be) is the same as the ultimate aim of international communism: to create a one world socialist system and make the United States an official part of it".

McGeorge Bundy was the establishment's gravedigger overseer during the passing of the gavel from JFK (also CFR) and LBJ on November 22, 1963.

According to NEWSWEEK of December 2, 1963, it was Bundy who "took charge" at the White House after JFK was assassinated (by a communist), making preparations for the arrival of the new President. Bundy accompanied LBJ in the helicopter from Andrews Air Force Base to the White House along with Defense Secretary Robert Strange McNamara and Undersecretary of State George Ball (CFR), where they discussed defense.

On November 23, Bundy took LBJ to be briefed by CIA Director John McCone (CFR). A conference was held with Secretary of State Dean Rusk (CFR) and Undersecretary of State W. Averill Harriman (CFR).

McGeorge and his brother William P. (also CFR) were loyal to Communist Soviet spy Al-

ger Hiss (also CFR). Bundy is also a member of the International Bilderberger Group - as are Rusk and Ball.

But perhaps it is even more foreboding for the Republic that he goes to be president of the Ford Foundation "on February 28." "The latter functions abroad and domestically as one of the State Department's most important 'private' arms".

It helped finance the Center of Research in Economic and Social Development in Santa Domingo, a communist indoctrination center.

The Ford Foundation (tax exempt and with assets of \$3 billion, 316 million in 1959) has helped finance the Council on Foreign Relations and its interlocking organizations since the late 20s. Ten of the fifteen members of the Board of Trustees of the Foundation are members of the Council on Foreign Relations (1959).

In 1952, the Ford Foundation established the Fund for the Republic with a \$15,000,000 grant. By 1955 its support of 5th Amendment Communists was blatant. Seven of the eighteen Officers and Directors of the Fund are members of the Council on Foreign Relations (1957).

And on and on.

It is hard to determine in which position Bundy is most dangerous. Nothing has changed but names on doors.

Sincerely,

Curtis W. Caine, M. D.

4332 Manhattan Road

Jackson

MAY 24 1965

NBC Reporter Gets Fellowship

NEW YORK, May 23 (UPI). Welles Hangen, National Broadcasting Co. correspondent in Germany, has been awarded the annual fellowship for foreign correspondents of the Council on Foreign Relations, it was announced today.

Hangen will study and discuss foreign policy problems at the Council's headquarters here for one year.

The Council on Foreign Relations, a nonpartisan, non-profit organization, was established in 1921 to study political, economic and strategic problems related to American foreign policy.

FEB 4 1965

25X1

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U.S. Policy Failing, Many Leaders Say In Poll on Vietnam

WASHINGTON, Feb. 3 (AP) —A private poll of nearly 600 prominent Americans has found that most approve of United States objectives in aiding South Vietnam and 91 per cent think that United States policy there is failing.

More than half suggested alternatives to the Administration's policy, but opinions were split between those who advocated American military withdrawal, and the slightly smaller number who urged that the war be widened.

The poll was taken by the Council on Foreign Relations, a nonprofit organization that takes no stand, as an organization, on United States policy.

The chairman of the council's board is John J. McCloy, the New York financier who has held various important Government posts. One of the directors is William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.

The council said that the survey's results were based on responses from nearly 600 members of the council's committees on foreign relations in 33 American cities. The members answered questions suggested last November. The survey found:

¶Eight out of ten approved the current United States objective of helping the South Vietnamese Government defend its independence and consolidate its authority over its territory.

¶Ninety per cent believed that United States policy in Vietnam was "failing."

Of those who believed that the policy was failing, somewhat less than half favored United States military disengagement, although not necessarily total withdrawal. A somewhat smaller number wanted the war expanded. A quarter of these desired a major expansion, with a few advocating the use of nuclear weapons if necessary.

¶More than half of the total advocated continued United States aid even if this required substantially greater help than the United States was now supplying.

¶More than half urged that the United States supply political, economic and social advisers, but said that decisions on reforms should be left to the South Vietnamese Government.

¶More than a third said that the United States should intervene in South Vietnamese politics, needed to assure political, economic and social reforms.

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COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

THE HAROLD PRATT HOUSE | 58 EAST 68TH STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10021 | TEL. (212) 535-

ROLLAND BUSHNER

Director

Committees on Foreign Relations Program

May 15, 1975

Mr. Angus Thuermer
Assistant to the Director
C.I.A.
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr. Thuermer:

This is just a brief note to send you a blind copy of my letter to Mr. Colby and to thank you for the efficient arrangements that were made for his visit to our Committee on Foreign Relations in San Francisco. I do appreciate the cordial way in which you helped me with this arrangement, and I hope the trip went well in all respects.

If Mr. Colby found the Committee a rewarding audience, and would be willing to meet with another of the Committees on some other trip, we would of course be delighted. I enclose a list of the other Committees so you may know their locations. Their season, which is now concluding, will begin again in late September.

With warm regards.

Sincerely,

Rolland Bushner

Rolland Bushner

Enclosures

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(SAN FRANCISCO)

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May 15, 1975

The Honorable William E. Colby
Director
C. I. A.
McLean, Virginia

C
Dear Mr. Colby:

O
We have had most enthusiastic reports from San Francisco about the dinner discussion you led for the San Francisco Committee on Foreign Relations. Committee members especially appreciated your straight-forward responses to their questions and it is evident that you convinced them of your sincerity.

P
Y
We are of course delighted that they found the meeting so impressive, and I hope you felt it was worthwhile. We are certainly most grateful to you for meeting with this group.

Sincerely,

Rolland Bushner

STAT

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Telephone (415) 622-2642

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225 Bush Street
San Francisco, California 94104
Telephone (415) 894-3232

WILLIAM H. WAINWRIGHT, *Assistant Secretary*
555 California Street
P.O. Box 37020
San Francisco, California 94137
Telephone (415) 622-2865

April 7, 1975

Mr. Angus Thuermer
Assistant to the Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Thuermer:

It was with great pleasure that I heard from Rolland Bushner at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York that Mr. Colby will be able to meet with the San Francisco Committee on Foreign Relations on May 7, 1975 at a dinner meeting. Our meeting is scheduled to be held at the Sheraton-Palace Hotel in the Californian Room at 6:00 p.m. It will start with cocktails and dinner. Afterwards we look forward to hearing from Mr. Colby. We generally ask our speakers to talk for about thirty minutes to allow plenty of time for an informal period of questions and discussions. As Mr. Colby undoubtedly knows from his experiences at the Council, our meetings are on a "not-for-attribution" basis, allowing for somewhat freer expressions of opinion. Our members are drawn from the business, academic and professional circles and are all American citizens. Some of our members will undoubtedly be hearing Mr. Colby's public speech at the Commonwealth Club the same day and they will particularly look forward to hearing him speak in a smaller closed group and having the opportunity of discussing his subject with him.

We understand that Mr. Colby needs no assistance with his arrangements, but if there is anything we can do to be of help, please let me know.

Sincerely,



H. Anton Tucher

STAT

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Letters to The Times

Ford's CIA Investigative Panel

Gerald Ford said he pardoned Richard Nixon for the good of the country. He said if everybody wore a WIN button it would help cure inflation. He now says he wants the true story on the Central Intelligence Agency. So he appoints Nelson Rockefeller and Ronald Reagan to investigate it.

The great Jack Benny will always be missed. But thanks to Mr. Ford the country will not forget how to laugh.

BOB GOGGINS
Los Angeles

After reading about the alleged domestic spying conducted by the CIA I feel that the time has come for a complete congressional examination of the CIA. Keeping secret files on citizens and using "surreptitious entry" to gain damaging information is what one expects a Gestapo-type secret police force to do, not an agency prohibited by law from doing so.

I feel that such actions by the CIA will lead us into a government-controlled 1984 type of situation. If files of the type alleged to have been kept were actually in existence I feel that we should be told what criteria qualified a person for these files and who had access and used their contents.

Not only do I think that it is undemocratic to keep secret files on individuals, but I feel that it may lead to further government encroachment on the privacy of citizens and their right to freely disagree with the government's policies—one of the rights upon which this country is based.

MICHAEL ROSE
Canoga Park

Rockefeller's heading up the CIA investigation is really putting the fox in charge of the hen house. As a matter of record, Rockefeller, C. Douglas Dillon, Lyman Lemnitzer and John T. Conner, as CIA investigation committee members, are all members of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Now, how about "no direct links with the CIA." Here is what ex-CIA official Victor Marchetti wrote in his book "The CIA and The Cult of Intelligence":

"It was in such an atmosphere of restiveness and doubt, on a January evening in 1968, that a small group of former intelligence professionals and other members of the cult of intelligence met to discuss the role of the CIA in U.S. foreign policy, not at CIA headquarters in Langley, Va., but at the Harold Pratt House on Park Avenue—the home of the Council on Foreign Relations. The discussion leader was investment banker C. Douglas Dillon . . . the main speaker was Richard Bissell . . . consultant to the CIA."

Bissell is a member of the CFR, as are Richard Helms and John McCone, who are former CIA directors.

My opinion is that the CIA is the CFR's secret army—and now, Rockefeller, a real CFR biggie, is heading up a CIA investigation. Some chuckle!

R. SPENCER
La Canada

In line with the clownish aspects of his Presidency, Mr. Ford has perpetrated another of his sinister jokes and appointed a fake committee to investigate the CIA.

The standard official answer to doubts expressed by the press and legislators concerning the fact that certain connections, past or present, might get in the way of panel members of this kind as effective investigators, is: "I don't think so."

If the question can be asked at all, why does it not disqualify the potential appointee?

The answer to that is that there is no intention whatsoever to investigate anything. The panel makes great window dressing and is as phony as a movie set.

GEORGE GAYNES
Studio City

Inasmuch as Rockefeller has been appointed head of the commission to investigate the CIA, where may I buy stock in a company that produces whitewash?

ED KYSAR
Sherman Oaks

President Ford's choices for the commission to examine the CIA are comparable to having President Nixon's former White House staff investigate abuses of the Watergate "plumbers."

ARLEN L. GROSSMAN
Mar Vista

President Ford might as well have appointed the Mafia to investigate the Cosa Nostra, if he's going to appoint conservatives to investigate CIA loyalists.

JAMES MEDINA
Chatsworth

If it is President Ford's intention to uncover the truth about the CIA's domestic activities, he couldn't have chosen a better commission to conceal it.

DAVID ALAN BOOTHBY
Los Angeles

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

THE HAROLD PRATT HOUSE | 58 EAST 68TH STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10021 | TEL.

ROLLAND BUSHNER
 Director
 Committees on Foreign Relations Program

December 17, 1974

The Honorable William E. Colby
 Director, Central Intelligence Agency
 McLean, Virginia


Dear Mr. Colby:

The officers of the San Francisco Committee on Foreign Relations were delighted to learn that you had agreed in principle to meet with that group in conjunction with your trip to San Francisco for a luncheon with the Commonwealth Club on January 17. They proposed that you meet with the Committee at dinner on January 16, or if that would not be possible they would suggest a reception from about 5 p.m. to 6:30 p.m. or a luncheon from 12:00 to 1:30 p.m. on the same day. If that would not work and you will be in San Francisco on January 15, a dinner or reception on that day would be another possibility.

Committee meetings are informal and off-the-record like the roundtable dinner that followed the general meeting here at the Council yesterday. As with that group, the wider perspective to be gained from your frank but considered comments to the leaders who belong to the Committee would be reflected widely.

In a few days I shall telephone your secretary, as you suggested, to see where a meeting with this Committee could be fitted into your San Francisco visit.

Sincerely,



Rolland Bushner

*San Fran P. informed I told Bushner we
 having to postpone San F. appearance*

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